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ANOTHER SUCH VICTORY: CONSTITUTIONAL
THEORY AND PRACTICE IN A WORLD
WHERE COURTS ARE NO DIFFERENT
FROM LEGISLATURESt
John Hart Ely*
There is nothing worse than an idea whose time has come.
Linda Hunt1
I. RECESS PERIOD FOR THE LEGAL PROCESS SCHOOL
Modern constitutional scholarship is generally characterized by a desire
to take up the question.., what politics should judges pursue, and on
the basis of what conception of the good should they act?
Robin West2
[Instead of chastising courts for their imperial presumption, commen-
tators celebrate them as the preferred forum for democratic
deliberation.
Allan C. Hutchinson3
never took the course on Legal Process. Indeed the idea that
appointed and life-tenured judges should behave differently from
elected officials had always seemed so evidently correct that it took
me a long time to understand that it even had a label, let alone an
entire "school" named after it.4 You can therefore imagine my befud-
t An earlier version of this Article was presented as the Sibley Lecture at the University of
Georgia Law School on October 31, 1989. My research assistants Peter Savich and Maria Tai
Wolff were especially helpful.
* Robert E. Paradise Professor of Law and Senior Research Fellow, Hoover Institution on
War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford University.
I Quoted in Zarin, A Part in the Play, The New Yorker, July 30, 1990, at 39.
2 West, Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 641, 644 (1990).
3 Hutchinson, The Three 'Rs': Reading/Rorty/Radically (Book Review), 103 Harv. L. Rev.
555, 555 (1989) (citing Dworkin and Tribe).
4 My own methodology for determining what issues are appropriately assigned to courts-
and in this respect I am conventionally described as a member of the legal process school, e.g.,
M. Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies 189-90 (1987)-is one rooted not in any
supposed difference in reasoning capacity or political predilection between judges and other
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dlement at what is going on today. The academic left is telling us
officials, but rather primarily in the fact that judges (at least federal judges) need not stand for
reelection.
Approached philosophically-I have previously approached it more through an analysis of
the Constitution-the general theory is that a group of equals in the "original position"
attempting to frame a government would start from the presumption that no sane adult's
values are to count for more or less than any other's, which would lead rapidly to the
conclusion that public issues generally should be settled by a majority vote of such persons or
their representatives-with two, perhaps three, exceptions: (1) where a majority of such
persons votes to exclude other such persons from the process or otherwise to dilute their
influence on it; (2) where such a majority enacts one regulatory regime for itself and another,
less favorable one, for one or another minority; or (3) where other side constraints seem
sufficiently important (and vulnerable to majority sentiment) that the framers decide by
supermajority vote to designate them in a constitutional document and thereby render them
immune to displacement by anything short of a similar supermajority vote in the future. The
third exception seems to me more problematic than the first two for a liberal theorist. In the
context of the American Constitution, however, that is an observation that is somewhat beside
the point, as all three exceptions plainly characterize that document to a degree.
It seems to me to follow further-here comes the "legal process" part-that precisely
because of their tenure, courts are the appropriate guardians of at least exceptions (1) and (2):
Obviously our elected representatives are the last persons we should trust with
identification of either of these situations. Appointed judges, however, are comparative
outsiders in our governmental system, and need worry about continuance in office only
very obliquely. This does not give them some special pipeline to the genuine values of
the American people: in fact it goes far to ensure that they won't have one. It does,
however, put them in a position objectively to assess claims-though no one could
suppose the evaluation won't be full of judgment calls-that either by clogging the
channels of change or by acting as accessories to majority tyranny, our elected
representatives in fact are not representing the interests of those whom the system
presupposes they are.
J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 103 (1980). That judges are to
be the principal enforcers of the collection of provisions that make up exception (3) is entirely
settled by history, and I have no quarrel with it: indeed the supposition that no right is to be
thus designated unless it is unusually vulnerable to majority sentiment makes judicial enforce-
ment appropriate. What does not follow from anything said above, or in my opinion from
anything sensible said ever, is that judges are also to be given a license to create or "discover"
further rights, not justified by exceptions (1) or (2) nor ever constitutionalized by a
supermajority, and protect them as if they had been.
A more traditional "legal process" view disagrees with this last point, as it sees the compara-
tive advantage of courts as residing in their greater capacity to gauge and refine the philosophi-
cal temper of their nation and times, to extract and develop principles from the traditions and
moral beliefs of the American people and enforce them in the name of the Constitution. See,
e.g., Hart, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73
Harv. L. Rev. 84, 99 (1959); Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double
Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 Yale L.J. 221, 243-54, 285-311 (1973). I find this
approach entirely misguided. See J. Ely, supra, at 48-70. Today's fight, however, is not with
these commentators, but rather with those who reject our shared starting assumption that
those who would justify judicial invalidation of legislation must do so on the basis of some
characteristic that courts possess in greater measure than ordinary political officials. The more
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there is no reason courts should feel an obligation to behave differ-
ently from elected officials. The large liberal academic center, always
first to be second, is generally going along. And in what the naive
might deem an ironic twist-though it is not likely greatly to surprise
those radicals who understand their project--our recent Republican
presidents have adopted the idea with a vengeance,5 and so to a sub-
stantial extent has Congress. Just about everybody is climbing
aboard.
Naturally, the conviction that judges interpreting the Constitution
are supposed to be doing something other than enforcing their own
values survives in certain segments of the legal culture-albeit mainly
among people educated in an earlier era. Nor am I suggesting (what
is almost always an error) that the present is an entirely unique time.
The attitude in ascendance has conspicuous precursors, notably the
legal realist movement of the early twentieth century. In fact the
legal realists were less likely than the legal culture is today to draw
the fallacious inference from (a) the observation that judges in fact
allow their politics to affect their constitutional interpretations to (b)
the prescription that that's what judges should do:7 in that regard,
today's development is newA It's basically a cycle, though, and as of
basic fight today is between those who worry at all about limits on judicial review, and those
who do not.
5 See West, supra note 2, at 641 (footnote omitted):
American constitutional law.., is in a state of profound transformation. The "liberal-
legalist" and purportedly politically neutral understanding of constitutional guarantees
that dominated constitutional law and theory during the fifties, sixties, and seventies, is
waning, both in the courts and in the academy. What is beginning to replace liberal
legalism in the academy, and what has clearly replaced it on the Supreme Court, is a
very different conception-a new paradigm--of the role of constitutionalism... in a
democratic state. Unlike the liberal-legal paradigm it is replacing, the new paradigm is
overtly political-and overtly conservative-in its orientation and aspiration.
Professor West is not one to see only what scares her, and she does not commit that error here.
She is quite clear that the legal process school is under serious attack from both ends of the
political spectrum: "Both the progressives and conservatives seem increasingly willing to grant
to the critics of liberal theory their main point.., that constitutional adjudication is conse-
quently necessarily political." Id. at 644.
6 The legal process movement is conventionally referred to as part of a post-realist
reconstruction.
7 Indeed, the very point of early realists like Holmes and Brandeis was that judges should
understand that what they are doing is not essentially different from legislating, and approach
their jobs with appropriate restraint.
8 Of course the refrain that one's opponents are "reading their personal political views into
the Constitution" is as old as the republic, and most of the time it has probably had some
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1991, the neo-realists (which turns out to include your local critical
legal scholar, and Ronald Reagan, and just about everybody in
between) seem almost certainly to have won the day, which is to say
about the next twenty years (about as long as anyone should ever try
to predict anything anyhow).
A. Teachers and Students
This is a legacy of the sixties-the old conviction that if any private
sentiment is strong enough it's entitled to carry the day.
Bart Giamatti
Dr. Spock was indicted for the wrong crime.
Vern Countryman
The generation coming of age in legal academia-we might as well
admit it, the generation doing its most creative work-received its
legal education in the late 1960s or later. During this period, largely
thanks to the disgraceful duo of Indochina and Watergate, impatience
with institutional deference, impatience in particular with deference
to the "democratic" branches, reached what may be an all-time high
in this country. This impatience has reflected itself, with a vengeance,
in legal scholarship.
It is articulated most clearly among those who identify themselves
as critical legal scholars. Here one finds a general skepticism of tradi-
tional notions of judicial craft, as exhibited in the following from
Mark Tushnet:
[C]onsider the craft of "writing novels." Its practice includes Trol-
lope writing The Eustace Diamonds, Joyce writing Finnegans Wake,
and Mailer writing The Executioner's Song. We might think of Jus-
tice Blackmun's opinion in Roe as an innovation akin to Joyce's or
Mailer's. It is the totally unreasoned judicial opinion. To say that it
does not look like Justice Powell's decision in some other case is like
saying that a Cubist "portrait" does not portray its subject in the
manner that a member of the academy would paint it. The observa-
foundation. It takes an unusually strong or apolitical judge to avoid being discernibly affected
by her assessment of the politically desirable outcome. What is new is the evolving consensus
on most fronts that that is the way judges are supposed to behave.
9 As they approach middle age, law professors tend to deny their dwindling creativity by
becoming deans, media personalities, advisors to politicians, or some other form of jackanapes.
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tion is true but irrelevant to the enterprise in which the artist or judge
was engaged and to our ultimate assessment of his or her product.10
10 M. Tushnet, Red, White, and Blue: A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Law 54 (1988)
(footnote omitted).
On the Constitution as a Lead Sheet. Over the years I've thought about trying to elaborate
the metaphor between constitutional interpretation and jazz improvisation. It "works" on the
gimmicky level that various approaches to interpreting the Constitution can validly be
compared to various jazz styles. One might point to: approaches that embellish but never
entirely lose the original melody; those that gradually abandon the original melody entirely but
insist that each phrase relate to its predecessor; so-called "horizontal" approaches that
abandon the melody but maintain a relation to the chord progression of the entire song;
horizontal approaches geared to the chord progression of the particular line; "vertical"
approaches that insist only on compatibility with the particular chord being played at the time,
and so forth. (Having written that, I understand why music lecture rooms are equipped with
pianos.) It should be no trick for readers of this Article to attach the names of various
constitutionalists to these brief descriptions. If you have trouble placing a clause-bound
"originalism," that's because it is essentially a rejection of any sort of "jazz" in this context.
(The problem with this view is that the Constitution quite often-and quite intentionally, I
think, though for present purposes that doesn't matter-gives us nothing but chords.) The
sort of legal realism that is the subject of this Article also seems to me not to fit, as it totally
rejects the relevance of the "chart" except, perhaps, as a device for inducing false
consciousness.
The reason I haven't written this up is that it was never clear what anyone was supposed to
learn from it about either constitutional theory or jazz-aside from something thoroughly
trivial about the one she knew less about. (I do find it interesting that the way I play-
basically a mix of the first, third, and fourth approaches mentioned--corresponds pretty well
to the way I write about constitutional law, though I hasten to add that I am not so demented
as to have sought this integration consciously.) The metaphor turns out not to be of much use
in positioning us to say "this is just pounding-it doesn't count as constitutional law." For
every time there develops what appears to be a consensus among musicians (and their
listeners), to the eflect that a certain interval is unacceptable noise, someone who can't be
dismissed on any principled basis as "not a real musician" starts using it, and often others
follow. Minor seconds and major sevenths weren't really accepted in jazz until the 1930s
(classical music was often several decades ahead), and the raised fourth or tritone--originally
if loosely, the "flatted fifth"-was controversial as recently as the 1940s, but today is accepted
as commonplace, if not indeed a trifle tired. (While I suppose this too will pass, an unadorned
minor or flatted ninth-one that is neither wrapped within a "bigger" chord nor formed by a
fleeting, or "passing," note in the melody-still strikes my ear, as I believe it does most
people's, as uncivilized. Indeed, I hereby propose the unadorned minor ninth as the artistic
equivalent of Roe v. Wade, in place of Tushnet's blasphemous nomination of Joyce.)
This isn't to say that certain forms of constitutional interpretation aren't illegitimate for
specific institutions in specific societies with specific constitutional charters: they are. All that
can be inferred from this excursion is what Tushnet infers from the literary context, that those
who assert the possibility of differentiating valid from invalid constitutional interpretation on
the basis of "craft limits" of a sort they assert are recognized in the arts are likely to be badly
disappointed when they get around to a close examination of the alleged analogues. There are,
however, more valid ways of testing constitutional theories than by the educated "feel" of
those in the "interpretive community."
Virginia Law Review
In particular, the legal process school's core methodological assump-
tion is scornfully cast aside, here by Duncan Kennedy:
I will have nothing to say about the impact of "institutional compe-
tence" considerations on the motives for lawmaking I discuss. I
assume that the only grounds for distinguishing between courts, legis-
latures and administrative agencies as lawmakers are (i) that the false
consciousness of the public requires it or (ii) that the decisionmaker
has a quite specific theory about how his or her particular institu-
tional situation should modify his or her pursuit of political
objectives.11
Critical scholars are not a fringe group in contemporary legal scholar-
ship; in time it will be understood that their influence on the profes-
sion has approached that of their legal realist forebears, which is to
say it will have been major. The large liberal center of legal academia,
characteristically fearful of getting out of step with the latest trend,
has been importantly affected by the anti-legal process message here.
It wasn't a hard sell. Most law teachers went to law school to
become lawyers: if we'd wanted to be theorists we would have gone to
graduate school. But we got high grades in law school (on examina-
tions rarely designed to measure scholarly skills) and learned we
could get this unconscionably cushy job: teaching yes-but with
shorter hours, higher pay, and slimmer tenure requirements than
other sorts of teaching-and almost an open invitation, at some
schools a virtual obligation, to pass oneself off not simply as a lawyer
but also as an expert on any subject on which he or she took two or
more courses in college. Who among this group are the most likely to
be drawn to constitutional law specifically? Generally those inter-
ested in public policy analysis, in figuring out what changes, on bal-
ance, would be good for society. And what gets in the way of simply
doing that analysis and calling it constitutional law? The assumption
that courts aren't supposed to behave exactly like legislatures. Thus it
becomes a liberating day indeed when headliners like Kennedy
announce that there is nothing improper in courts' imposing their
own policy preferences in the name of constitutional law, indeed that
n1 Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special
Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 Md. L. Rev. 563, 564-65
(1982). Mark Kelman confirms my instinct that Kennedy's position is atypical of critical
scholars only in its candor. M. Kelman, supra note 4, at 192.
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there even may be something vaguely fascist about supposing they
should be doing anything else.
Thus, no less a luminary than Laurence Tribe-the Tyler Professor
of Constitutional Law at Harvard, needless to say no "crit," and him-
self a formidable influence on the profession-has resolutely refused
to let himself get sidetracked worrying about the differences among
various legal institutions,1 2 but has forthrightly defined the constitu-
tional task of courts as that of making "difficult substantive choices"
among "inevitably controverted political, social, and moral concep-
tions."13 And indeed, the legal literature generally analyzes constitu-
tional issues in terms of wise social policy-which, felt strongly, is
likely to be labeled "principle"-before proceeding to the inevitable
demonstration that, properly understood, the precedents do not pre-
clude the proffered outcome.1 4 The really fancy thinkers appear to
12 See, e.g., L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 1-9, at 15-17 (2d ed. 1988); cf. L.
Tribe, Constitutional Choices 6 (1985) ("For me, such questions [of how judicial review is
legitimated] seem basically unanswerable; theories that offer or presuppose answers to them-
any answers-seem not worth pursuing with passion or even worth criticizing in great
detail.").
13 L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, supra note 12, § 8-7, at 584; see also, e.g., id. § 1-
8, at 13-14; L. Tribe, God Save This Honorable Court at ix (1985). To the same general effect,
see, e.g., Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 469, 470-71 (1981); Brest, The
Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional
Scholarship, 90 Yale L.J. 1063 (1981); Tushnet, The Dilemmas of Liberal Constitutionalism,
42 Ohio St. L.J. 411, 424 (1981).
14 Under this approach every question of public policy is a constitutional question. Many
do not regard this implication as an occasion for rethinking. Those who do are probably most
likely to respond that not all questions of public policy are constitutional questions, only those
that involve rights. Any constitutional attack, however, can be framed in terms of rights, see,
e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 172-75
(1908); for that matter, the "right to choose"/"right to life" debate, "right to work" laws,
"victims' rights," and so forth should also be consulted. The position that the only rights that
count are those alluded to in the Constitution having been foresworn, the response that the
disfavored cases don't "really" involve rights is likely to translate into the position that they
don't involve rights the commentator thinks deserve recognition.
There are two standard strategies for "sophisticating" this approach (and, incidentally,
drawing it out into a full-semester course). First, one can admit that where the judiciary is not
in as good a position as other governmental actors to get a reliable grip on the facts bearing on
the wisdom of the action in question, it should proceed cautiously. This might be styled a
sensitivity to considerations ofjusticiability. Second, one might hold that in order to declare a
legislative action unconstitutional, a court (or commentator) must conclude that it is not
simply a bad idea, but a really bad idea. This introduces a second layer of unvarnished
subjectivity.
The fact that so much legal writing today boils down so quickly to the expression of political
preferences has contributed massively to the notorious lack of recent consensus within legal
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understand (albeit tacitly) that such an approach is unacceptably
reductionist, or perhaps what they understand is that it isn't a very
interesting way to spend their time. In any event, they are drawn
increasingly to the development and embroidery of "constitutional
theories" that may borrow from other disciplines in new ways (new at
least to lawyers), but whose relevance to any issue affecting how
courts are supposed to act-or for that matter how any nonacademic
segment of the profession or state is supposed to act-is elusive. 15
Some of the people I've described, however, are getting a little long
in the tooth themselves. Could this just be a rapidly passing fancy? I
don't think so. Teachers are important forces in shaping future think-
ing. Sometimes societal forces can render a generation of students
academia about what counts as good scholarship. (In turn, the inevitable playout of that lack
of consensus, in increasingly political hiring decisions, has understandably induced the
literature to get still more political.) I suspect this description has always fit law more than
other disciplines. (At no point have law teachers generally been anything other than lawyers
who knew a good thing when they saw it, and there have for many years been an
embarrassingly large number of professional journals in our business, most of whose
publication decisions are made by persons with substantially less academic training and
experience than even we have.) But the description seems to fit particularly well now.
15 In particular, I have in mind here the now-common discussions of techniques of literary
criticism, cef. supra note 10 and accompanying text (describing application of musical and
literary theory to constitutional interpretation), and the rediscovery of "the republican
tradition," which a number of commentators find of significant intellectual interest but whose
social and political assumptions seem substantially irrelevant to 20th century America.
The theory of judicial review articulated in Democracy and Distrust was intended to be as
compatible with "republican" legislative and community behavior as with a "pluralist" model.
See, e.g., J. Ely, supra note 4, at 80-82, 135. Indeed, by constitutionally condemning the
infliction of "inequality for its own sake-[treating] a group worse not in the service of some
overriding social goal but largely for the sake of simply disadvantaging its members," id. at
153-it counseled a significant judicial push away from bare-knuckled pluralism in the
direction of "public values." Thus, my point here is only that anything resembling a full-scale
attempt to impose a "republican" political mentality seems badly out of place under
contemporary conditions, and would in addition be unwarranted as a matter of constitutional
interpretation, as no coherent account of the document supports it. This is hardly surprising,
as the "republican" and "pluralist" models contended at the time of the framing, and if one
had to pick a "winner," it would have to be the latter (personified perhaps most fully by James
Madison), while the former is conventionally identified with the antifederalists, whose attempt
to defeat ratification failed. This certainly doesn't mean republicanism is aforbidden model-
the document defeats that claim as well-only that it cannot properly be imposed as
constitutional law.
The increasing call in the legal literature for "different voices" denotes a worthy goal of
judicial and academic appointments, and of a "legal process" approach to the allocation of
political power. Presented as a first order theory of judicial review, however, it constitutes
only another version of the reductionist view that judges should do what, based on their
experience, seems right to them.
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resistant to what their teachers are trying to get across: it happened in
the late 1960s and early 1970s and produced the people I've been talk-
ing about, which is to say the generation of teachers most likely to
influence the students of today. Might not today's students stage a
similar rebellion against those very (realist) teachers? In time, of
course; as I said, it's a cycle. What law school deans say on opening
day is true: our students really are getting smarter all the time, and
they don't come close to accepting everything their teachers say. On
some issues the current student generation's rebellion against its
teachers is likely to be felt quite swiftly. On the issue of whether
courts should be trying to do something other than enforce their own
political preferences, however, I'm afraid it will be a while.
In the first place, if "realism" is an attractive haven for young law
teachers, it is even more so for law students. Meta-analysis, asking
questions about questions rather than asking the questions them-
selves, is unfamiliar and frustrating, particularly for already flum-
moxed students who were hoping to find in the Constitutional Law
course an outlet for the sort of political and moral debate they had
enjoyed in college (and which may even had led them to suppose,
however benightedly, that they'd like to be lawyers). "Getting to the
point"-well, is abortion murder or isn't it?-is more familiar and
comfortable. In years past constitutional law professors battled to
domesticate this impulse out of their students. But today, many
teachers (by now it's probably most) agree with the student impulse,
and direct their efforts toward bringing around the politically unen-
lightened-as of course one would if one thought it to be the unvar-
nished role of constitutional courts to find and do the politically
correct thing. And many of them are very popular, I have no doubt
also very gifted, teachers.
The stereotype has it, though, that today's law students are more
conservative politically than their professors. Like most stereotypes
this one has its counterexamples; it also contains a good deal of truth.
Doesn't that suggest a quicker turnaround than I have predicted?
Again, not on the legal process/legal realism dispute. In the first
place, our conservative students aren't stupid. Given who's making
the judicial appointments these days, why shouldn't judges enforce
1991]
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their vision of the good society in the name of the Constitution? 6
Awesome-er, I mean, Right On, Professor. Second, and on a less
calculating level, today's students are unusually fertile ground for the
realist message. Yuppies (and yuppie wanna-bes) don't need to be
sold on instant gratification. The drugs of choice may have changed,
but they still want their Maypo and they want it now, 17 an impulse
that is incompatible with the notion that in certain areas courts
should await political decision. Thus, the victory over that archaic
idea seems assured for some time to come: on the left and on the right,
in the classroom and in the writings of emerging constitutional schol-
ars, 1 the "false consciousness" that judges should behave differently
from other politicians is on the run.
B. The Judicial Appointment Process
One can imagine that people could have views on the merits ofpolitical
issues... that contradict their views of the constitutional aspects of the
same question. But the people who position themselves to be nominated
for federal judgeships are not part of that imagined group.
Mark Tushnet 9
16 How do the teachers miss this, you may ask? I expect true believers don't: presumably
it's all part of the recipe for revolution. For liberals I suspect the myopia results from their
general and unrealistic optimism about the power of reason to "enlighten" (get others to see
things their way).
17 See N.Y. Times, July 21, 1989, at C1-C2 (reporting on "Beyond the Deficit Problem:
'Now-Now-ism' and 'The New Balance,"' a speech of Richard Darman to the National Press
Club on July 20, 1989).
Is See, e.g., E. Chemerinsky, Interpreting the Constitution at xi (1987) (recommending
open-ended modernism on the part of the judiciary, an "indeterminate, open-ended process").
"The core characteristic of open-ended modernism is its explicit premise that justices have,
and should have, discretion in deciding constitutional cases, and that their decisions are
inevitably based on their personal values." Id. at 109. Lest you suppose I have chosen some
obscure eccentric to make my point, I hasten to point out that Chemerinsky is the author of
the Foreword to the Harvard Law Review's 1989 Supreme Court issue, and thus presumptively
the second "hottest" constitutional theorist in the country. See Chemerinsky, The Supreme
Court, 1988 Term-Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 43 (1989) (an
extended exposition of the same thesis; see especially, e.g., id. at 47-49). (Nor am I pulling a
fast one by dragging you back to the historic recesses of 1989. By the same rough measure, the
hottest constitutional theorist is Robin West, quoted above, supra note 5. See West, The
Supreme Court, 1989 Term-Foreword: Taking Freedom Seriously, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 43
(1990); see also, e.g., infra note 26 (discussing positions of emerging academics)).
19 Tushnet, Does Constitutional Theory Matter?: A Comment, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 777, 780
(1987).
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Over the past decade there have been important changes in the way
federal judges are selected. 0 First, a good deal more attention than
before seems to be devoted to the question of how prospective nomi-
nees are likely to vote on the issues that can be anticipated.21 Previ-
ously, thanks in part to the then prevailing "myth" that judges are not
just another set of politicians,2 2 the tendency was to appoint "first-rate
lawyers,"'2 3 the "lions of the bar," without much attention to how
exactly they were likely to vote on particular issues.2 4 Second, judicial
philosophy and political predilection have been conflated more explic-
itly than before, and the appointments process has achieved a degree
20 1 necessarily am talking mainly about former President Reagan here. It seems likely,
however, that President Bush will behave in much the same way. See Lewis, Bush Picking the
Kind of Judges Reagan Favored, N.Y. Times, April 10, 1990, at Al, col. 2; see also infra text
accompanying notes 41-51 (discussing appointment of Justice Souter). In significant degree
this began with former President Carter, who did a fairly good job of stacking the lower federal
courts with liberals. Carter had no strong philosophy of appropriate judicial behavior; this
therefore appears in large measure to have been a by-product of his program of appointing
large numbers of minorities and women. The intrusiveness of Senate confirmation hearings
has also greatly increased over the past few years. E.g., Totenberg, The Confirmation Process
and the Public: To Know or Not to Know, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1213 (1988).
21 See also infra note 105 (suggesting that more attention is now paid to appointments
process because it is perceived as more important).
22 Indeed this was the model Ronald Reagan followed when he was Governor of California.
23 Hart, supra note 4, at 101. (It's not my ideal either, as it tends to perpetuate uniformity
of outlook. J. Ely, supra note 4, at 59. However, there are ways of dealing with that problem
that are more responsible than discarding the idea that judges are supposed to behave
differently from legislators.)
24 President Ford made one appointment to the Supreme Court, that of John Paul Stevens,
who appeared at the time, and indeed has turned out, to be somewhere between moderate and
liberal. President Nixon got the opportunity to appoint four people, only two of whom could
be comfortably classified as conservatives. President Johnson, it is true, made two liberal
appointments, though one was an extremely close friend and the other was probably picked in
part because Johnson discerned, correctly, that it was high time there was a black person on
the Court. President Kennedy made two appointments, one of a liberal who didn't stay very
long, the other of a man who did not appear to be much of a liberal at the time and has indeed
proved not to be. President Eisenhower's appointments included two of the Court's most
liberal and activist recent members (Warren and Brennan); on the other hand, of President
Truman's four appointments three were quite conservative, one a moderate. Thus, to find a
precedent for Reagan's approach (unless it's Carter) one has to go back to Franklin Roosevelt,
who was quite single-minded about appointing men who could be counted on to side with the
New Deal on issues of federal power. (It's true that Felix Frankfurter and Stanley Reed are
not remembered as "liberal" justices, but that's because they stuck around long enough for the
issues to change, not because Roosevelt's investigation was faulty.)
Of course presidents have always taken cognizance of the nominal political party (if any) of
a prospective nominee, but historically-though this too is changing-to know that was not to
know much. Moreover, appointments of members of "the other" party were not all that rare.
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of "realism" that should put even the "crits" to shame. Recall that
Reagan's judicial "litmus test," which actually made it into the
Republican platforms in 1980 and 1984, was not "What does the can-
didate think about Roe v. Wade?" but rather "What does the candi-
date think about abortion?"25 Should the answers to those questions
run in opposite directions, the assumption is evidently that the latter
is the more reliable datum. Better not to face that choice, though, as
people for whom the answers differ are people to avoid, if not indeed
dangerous schizophrenics.2 6 Thus, although the nomination of Rob-
ert Bork to the Supreme Court was accompanied by the usual smoke
about his being a judge who would follow the law instead of making
it, few were fooled: Bork was named because he had spent a career
essentially promising to reverse certain outcomes the Reagan Admin-
25 See N.Y. Times, July 13, 1980, at 14, col. 1 ("We will work for the appointment of judges
at all levels of the judiciary who respect traditional family values and the sanctity of innocent
human life."); N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1984, at A18, col. 1 ("reaffirming support" for such
appointments). This works both ways. See, e.g., Senator Kennedy's attempts to get Judge
Souter to share with the Judiciary Committee his moral views on abortion (though admittedly
Kennedy and the rest of the Committee had been thwarted in attempting to discern Souter's
legal views on the subject). N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1990, at 10, col. 5. (Actually this turned
into a pretty neat whipsaw for Souter: having refused to share his legal views about abortion on
the ground that that would be improper, see infra text accompanying notes 124-31, he then
refused to share his moral views on the subject on the ground that they wouldn't properly
affect his legal judgment. Id.
26 Thus in the writing of emerging academics, the position that judges should not invariably
enforce their policy choices in the name of the Constitution has become not simply
wrongheaded but essentially inconceivable. See, e.g., Estrich, Controlling the Language,
Winning the Debate, 41 Harv. L. Bull. 33 (1989): "We could debate endlessly the question
whether Roe v. Wade was rightly decided .... I think it is; and every pro-choice person I
know agrees. Every anti-abortion person I know thinks it isn't." See also Hirshman, Bronte,
Bloom, and Bork: An Essay on the Moral Education of Judges, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 177, 202
n.158 (1988) (suggesting that I misdescribed my position when I indicated during my criticism
of Roe that I am opposed to laws restricting abortion). I suppose I should be thankful that
unlike my erstwhile colleague Estrich, Hirshman is at least aware of my discussion of Roe:
having one's credibility questioned is recognition of a sort. However, given Professor
Tushnet's obviously correct description of the incentive system, supra text accompanying note
19, I have some trouble imagining what my motive is supposed to have been. Indeed the first
example Tushnet gives of the sort of politically suicidal position he has in mind is precisely the
one Hirshman suspects I am feigning, that "it is a terrifically important thing for women to
have the right to choose abortion . . . . [but there is no] constitutional warrant for the
displacement of legislative decisions to restrict the availability of abortions." Tushnet, supra
note 19, at 779.
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istration found politically distasteful.27 The popular support for
Bork, of course, was thus rooted as well.2"
The reasons for the Senate's rejection of Bork may be more compli-
cated.2 9 The account most favorable to the senators is that they were
convinced that Bork's purported allegiance to the legal process ideal
was bogus, a cover for a remarkably consistent tendency to reach the
politically conservative result, and rejected him for that reason.
There is little doubt that genuine feelings along this line moved some
of Bork's critics.30 The notion that such suspicions are what account
27 For example, Mario Cuomo observed:
Bork was selected not for his objectivity but because the President believes Bork will
give him the results the President desires politically-for example, cut back of
affirmative action.
The evidence that that's what the President wants and expects is in the statements by
lobbyists on behalf of Bork, who are talking to conservatives and telling them that if
Bork is selected, you'll get a change in abortion, you'll get a change in criminal justice.
That's the proof positive.
Quoted in N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1987, at 37, col. 1. Governor Cuomo's characterization
receives at least indirect corroboration from Bruce Fein, who spent the first Reagan term
working on judicial selection in the Justice Department: "It became evident after the first term
that there was no way to make legislative gains in many areas of social and civil rights. The
President has to do it by changing the jurisprudence." Judging the Judges, Newsweek, Oct.
14, 1985, at 73. (This may not represent Judge Bork's own thinking, see infra note 30; my
suggestion is only that it is why he was nominated.) For further remarks on the subject of
attempting to achieve judicially what one cannot achieve legislatively, albeit this time from the
left, see infra note 33 (quotation from Hodding Carter).
2s See generally E. Bronner, Battle for Justice: How the Bork Nomination Shook America
(1989) (comprehensive narrative of the Bork nomination process, including discussion of the
various interests supporting and opposing the nomination); P. McGuigan & D. Weyrich,
Ninth Justice: The Fight for Bork (1990) (same).
29 One thing can be said with certainty: many of the tactics employed against Bork were
disgusting-such as the use of Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union v.
American Cyanamid, 741 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1984), to suggest that he approved of
mandatory sterilization, the charge that he favored the "separate but equal" doctrine,
allegations that he was an agnostic, and the argument that although he had spent almost all of
his career in teaching and government service, he had never functioned as a public interest
lawyer. See E. Bronner, supra note 28, at 177-80, 261-63. Also disappointing (at least to one
generally inclined to regard Senator Simon as relatively straightforward) was Simon's
statement at the hearings that he had recently read Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.)
393 (1857), and "[i]t sounded an awful lot like Robert Bork." 1 The Nomination of Robert H.
Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the
Senate Judiciary Committee, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 314 (1987) [hereinafter Bork Hearings]. In
fact, since his early and repudiated flirtation with Lochner, Judge Bork has been a tireless critic
of the "substantive due process" theory of Dred Scott. To the extent Simon meant "only" to
imply that Bork is a racist, the charge is without foundation.
30 See, e.g., Posner, Bork and Beethoven, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 1365 (1990); Ackerman, Robert
Bork's Grand Inquisition (Book Review), 99 Yale L.J. 1419 (1990) (much the same argument,
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for the majority vote against him in the Senate, however, is one that
strains credulity past the breaking point.
albeit from a more liberal perspective). Critics have cited Bork's early endorsement of
Lochner-style substantive due process in Bork, The Supreme Court Needs a New Philosophy,
Fortune, Dec. 1968, at 138, to which one might add his more recent habit of inferring from the
fact that two commentators approve a line of cases that they must share a political agenda.
E.g., Bork, Styles in Constitutional Theory, 26 S. Tex. L.J. 383, 393-94 (1985). (This latter
point makes sense, of course, only if one is prepared to define constitutional theories strictly in
terms of the outcomes they achieve, and is no fairer than suggesting that because Bork and the
Grand Wizard of the Ku Klux Klan both disapprove of Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948),
and Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), they must have the same agenda.)
It is possible to make too much of these data. Bork's affair with Lochner was long since
forthrightly faced and forcefully abandoned. Most of his commentary on constitutional law
between 1971 and his hearings was quick and polemical, mainly speeches to sympathetic
audiences, a style that particularly lends itself to oversimple pigeonholing. His post-rejection
book, R. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law (1990), is a
vastly more discriminating work. (To pick a not entirely random example, its criticism of my
work, however convincing or unconvincing, is among the fairest that has appeared, which
unfortunately is no small sample.) But even here Bork can't resist the same revealing fallacy:
There is a remarkable consistency about these theorists. No matter the base from which
they start, they all wind up in the same place, prescribing a new constitutional law that
is much more egalitarian and socially permissive than either the actual Constitution or
the legislative opinion of the American public. That, surely, is the point of their efforts.
Id. at 6 (emphasis added). (To the same effect is Bork's earlier indication, at Alexander
Bickel's memorial service at Yale Law School, that there is a necessary "tension" between
political liberalism and a philosophy of judicial self-restraint, which Bickel had "resolved"
toward the end by becoming more conservative politically. See J. Ely, supra note 4, at 71-72.
Normally one shouldn't be held responsible for what he says at a close friend's memorial
service, but this was a prepared commentary on a matter of professional concern, which was
subsequently published-and a direct rejection of the legal process ideal that one's constitu-
tional inferences should not simply track one's politics.)
Moreover, on at least some occasions when political desire or necessity has conflicted with
Bork's reiterated theory of judicial review, a jurisprudence of original intent, it has been the
latter that seems to have given way. Repeatedly The Tempting of America forecloses issues by
a simple citation of judicial precedents that are at least contestable as a matter of original
intent. (Bork's impatience with such precedent under other circumstances is notorious.) See,
e.g., R. Bork, supra, at 37 (eviscerating "construction" of privileges or immunitites clause by
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873)), at 63 (same opinion's indication that
despite general language serious review under equal protection clause to be limited to racial
discrimination), at 150 (imposition of a "reasonableness" test on all classifications), at 43 (limi-
tation of Obligation of Contracts Clause to preexisting contracts), and at 48 (Justice Black's
position that fourteenth amendment incorporates the Bill of Rights). It is true that the last
two of these positions would be political anathema to an extreme right-winger, but each of
them is legally settled beyond reasonable possibility of overrle-Black's with exceptions
(indictment, civil juries) that there seems little question Bork would endorse. A virtue thus
may have been made of necessity, endorsement of the precedents serving to save the discussion
from consignment to what most readers would regard as the lunatic fringe. An understanda-
ble course, but not one open to an originalist. Perhaps more disturbing has been the fact that
Bork has been a consistent champion of expansive executive power vis-a-vis Congress. While
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The more believable explanation is basically the exact opposite, that
during the hearings Bork resolutely refused to conflate law and poli-
tics, or at least to conflate them in a way that would promise delivery
of certain outcomes the senators were prepared to make their own
litmus tests. Thus, the best existing study of the Bork affair (and a
studiously "balanced" work) characterizes Senator Kennedy's open-
ing salvo, the day the nomination was announced, in terms that seem
only mildly overdramatic:
The speech was a landmark for judicial nominations. Kennedy was
saying that no longer should the Senate content itself with examining
a nominee's personal integrity and legal qualifications, as had been
the custom-at least publicly-for half a century.... In fulfilling its
constitutional duty of "advice and consent" on judicial appointments,
[Kennedy suggested] the upper house should take politics and ideol-
ogy fully into account.3"
In his opening statement at the Judiciary Committee's hearings,
Chairman Biden, describing what he would be looking for in a
Supreme Court justice, made the point in quieter terms: "I believe all
Americans are born with certain inalienable rights. As a child of
God, my rights are not derived from.., the Constitution... but...
there are rounds on which one might defend this attitude, the intent of the framers is not
among them. (Executive power understandably escapes discussion in The Tempting of
America.)
On the other hand, no one is or can be completely devoid of tendencies to let his politics
influence his constitutional theorizing, and Bork is better than many in this regard. There
certainly have been occasions when Bork's constitutional outcomes have not been in accord
with what appear to be his political predilections. E.g., Finzer v. Barry, 798 F.2d 1450 (D.C.
Cir. 1986) (Bork, J., constitutionally protecting right to protest outside embassy). Noting that
the case involved an Episcopal priest wishing to demonstrate outside the Soviet and Nicara-
guan embassies seems to be cutting it a little thin; in any event it is difficult thus to "explain"
Lebron v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 749 F.2d 893 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J.,
protecting constitutional right to display in subway posters sharply critical of President Rea-
gan). Of course one can argue, if somewhat desperately, that both of those were judicial opin-
ions subject to Supreme Court review. But one cannot thus dismiss Professor Bork's 1981
testimony against the Human Life Bill, on the ground that it unconstitutionally sought to
overrule Roe v. Wade by statute. See R. Bork, supra, at 289-90, 325. That testimony seems
impossible to regard as signaling anything other than a genuine commitment to the legal pro-
cess ideal. (To these exhibits can now be added the fact that despite what he understandably
regards as the Senate's stupid and unfair denial of his dream of serving on the Supreme Court,
he continues-ironically unlike the very Senators who did him in, see infra note 33-to articu-
late the position that society's fundamental value choices are to be made by the elected
branches rather than the judiciary.)
31 E. Bronner, supra note 28, at 99.
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were given to me and to each of our fellow citizens by the Creator and
represent the essence of human dignity."'3 2 Such "natural rights"
rhetoric dates back in our own history to the Declaration of Indepen-
dence, but it wasn't presented there the way Biden was presenting it,
as a recipe on whose basis federal judges are supposed to overturn
legislation enacted by the elected branches of our government. The
natural rights rhetoric must have flowed smoothly for Senator Biden,
who was raised a Roman Catholic, as the Catholic Church is essen-
tially the only institution in twentieth century America that clings to
the faith that that concept can provide humankind with a knowable
and determinate set of moral commands. But in support of what
rights is the concept here being adduced? Most conspicuously, as the
hearings attest throughout, the rights to practice birth control and
secure abortions, "natural rights" calculated to convert the most com-
posed convent into Our Lady of Perpetual Commotion. Thus, no
matter how trippingly the rhetoric rolled off his tongue, Biden was
saying only what Senator Kennedy had said before him: there were
certain political outcomes that he (or important elements of his con-
stituency) simply had to have-no matter what.33
Surely the popular campaign against Bork (like the popular cam-
paign in his favor) was waged in these terms.34 This seems the inevi-
table result of making such disputes matters of general controversy, as
the public can't be expected genuinely to understand and debate theo-
ries of constitutional interpretation. It also seems likely that such
decisions will continue to be regarded by the general populus as poli-
tics as usual, at least for a considerable period: "Law has evolved in
the public's mind from a technical specialty, such as engineering or
32 1 Bork Hearings, supra note 29, at 101.
33 Note also the unspoken premise that the very body in which Biden and Kennedy sit, the
United States Congress, cannot be counted on to deliver the desired outcomes. (That's what
makes it necessary for them to insist on justices who will do so whatever the inclination of the
elected branches.) See 1 Bork Hearings, supra note 29, at 37 (Sen. Hatch quoting Hodding
Carter):
The nomination of Judge Bork forces liberals like me to confront a reality we don't
want to confront, which is that we are depending in large part on the least democratic
institution, with a small "d," in government to defend what it is we no longer are able to
win out there in the electorate.
Cf. infra text accompanying note 86 (when Supreme Court has ruled on a divisive issue, legis-
lators can sidestep it and avoid retribution at the polls).
34 M. Pertschuk & W. Schaetzel, The People Rising: The Campaign Against the Bork
Nomination (1989); sources cited supra note 28.
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medicine, to a terrain for the struggle over public policy. '35 And it
would be most surprising if the terms in which constituents were
reacting did not become in large measure the terms on whose basis the
senators made their decision.36
Robert Bork died by the sword that almost got him to the top. He
was nominated because he bid fair to restrict abortion, enhance presi-
dential power, get tough with criminals, and so forth-and he was
rejected for the same reasons. Judicial philosophy, as opposed to the
raw political desirability of the outcomes, had little to do with it either
way. One might hope that the Senate's overtly political reaction
could be limited to cases like Bork's, where (whatever the candidate's
own beliefs37) the nomination was made for transparently political
reasons.38 There can be no question that that was an aggravating fac-
tor, but it seems likely that it will not be a limiting one. There is
much in the Senate's performance to suggest that, like the emerging
academic consensus, and like Ronald Reagan as well, the Senate sees
the political desirability of the outcomes reached as the sole appropri-
ate test of judicial performance.39
Writing in The New York Review of Books after the Senate's rejec-
tion of Bork, Ronald Dworkin opined that the judge's demurrer to
Biden regarding the right to "privacy" had been "so thoroughly dis-
credited in the hearings, and proved so generally unpopular, that [he]
doubt[ed] that [it] will any longer be advanced even by lawyers and
35 E. Bronner, supra note 28, at 349. (Actually it seems doubtful that law ever seemed as
arcane to the public as engineering or medicine.)
36 Conversely, the terms of the Senate debate are likely to powerfully influence the way the
public thinks about issues of judicial qualification, and to an extent the way the Court
conceives its own role. See Friedman, Tribal Myths: Ideology and the Confirmation of
Supreme Court Nominations (Review Essay), 95 Yale L.J. 1283, 1317 (1986).
37 Bork's post-rejection book, The Tempting of America, supra note 30, seriously presents a
theory of judicial review, one he had been developing for some time. But that isn't why he was
nominated.
38 See Moran, Biden Taps Scholars to Rake Bork Record, Legal Times, July 13, 1987, at 1,
10.
39 Again, I am not suggesting that the present is unique in any of these respects. Just as
there have been earlier eras when legal "realism" dominated academia and the idea of role
differentiation was consequently denigrated, and earlier presidents who concentrated hard on
trying to figure out exactly how prospective nominees would vote in particular cases of interest
to them, there have been stretches-notably, perhaps, the mid-nineteenth century-when the
Senate rejected judicial nominees for raw political reasons. See, e.g., J. Hurst, The Growth of
American Law: The Law Makers 143-44 (1950).
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judges who found [it] congenial before." 4 If Dworkin means to
include law professors in this legion of the intimidated, I have to dis-
appoint him: since when are we supposed to tailor our constitutional
theories to either popular opinion or the theoretical insights of the
Senate Judiciary Committee? Dworkin may have a valid narrower
point, however: the contrary view is not likely to be articulated very
clearly by those trying to position themselves for appointment to, or pro-
motion within, the federal judiciary-at least not until control of the
Judiciary Committee changes hands.
Perhaps you're beginning to wonder whether I am acquainted with
the name David Souter, whose confirmation for the Supreme Court
was both recent and smooth.41 I am. Indeed, I hereby mark Souter's
Judiciary Committee hearings and Senate vote as exhibits to be intro-
duced in support of my later claim42 that Senate muscle-flexings in
this area are likely to be episodic and ultimately unavailing. But one
should not try to make too much one way or the other of Souter him-
self at this point, for even by the end of the hearings we hadn't learned
very much about him. Of course we learned some things. Judge Sou-
ter's answers were certainly fluent (the man speaks in paragraphs) and
he assimilated well his advisors' admonitions not to come across as
"another Bork" (either by stating his opinions in terms so sharp that
someone might be moved to disagree, or by asking the various panel
members to clarify their still more impenetrable "questions"). He
also stated often enough that he is a "good listener" that the senators
believed it (a surprising number indicating that this was qualification
enough for them).
We learned one other thing that is more to the present point:
whatever else he may or may not be, Justice Souter is not a strong
devotee of the notion that constitutional adjudication is supposed to
differ in kind from the decisions of elected politicians. When pressed
for his judicial philosophy, he regularly invoked the adjectives "prac-
tical" and "pragmatic, ' 43 words that conjure up a habit of thoughtful
moderation but do not signal any attitude toward his judicial role that
differs from what a responsible moderate would hope for in a candi-
4o Dworkin, From Bork to Kennedy, N.Y. Rev. Books, Dec. 17, 1987, at 40.
41 As for the also smooth post-Bork confirmation of Justice Kennedy, see infra text
accompanying notes 137-40.
42 See infra text accompanying notes 136-41.
43 E.g., N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1990, at Al, col. 2.
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date for Congress or the local board of selectmen. The judge's defense
of various prior Supreme Court decisions on the ground that they
were responses to "problems to be solved that the states [or Con-
gress'] simply would not address and the people wanted addressed"4
is, similarly, not a theory of judicial review that even hints at role
differentiation. "There are many things legislatures 'haven't done
anything about' that should be left in precisely that condition, ' 46 and
attempting to sort among various pieces of "unfinished business" on
the basis of which among them "the people really want" is a task so
plainly ill-suited to appointed and life-tenured judges that one can be
confident that any such purported performance would entirely reflect
the judges' own notions of what needs doing.4 7
The game thus quickly and understandably became an attempt to
ferret out Souter's politics. 4 8 This proved a fool's errand, however,
partly because Souter was cagier than his pursuers, and perhaps
partly because, not being an overly passionate fellow generally, Souter
seems not to invest deeply in whatever political views he happens to
entertain either. But though the evidence was circumstantial, most
observers thought they detected in some of Souter's answers a man
considerably less conservative than they had been led to expect on the
basis of reports that Souter had been "vouched for" by former Gover-
nor Sununu and Senator Rudman, and Judge Bork's pre-hearings op-
ed paean to Souter.49
What happened? There are at least four possibilities. First, Souter
in fact may be another Bork--okay, another Anthony Kennedy-and
just did a very good job of hiding it. Souter was nothing if not clever,
and the passages in his testimony that gave some of us hope would
hardly require a Houdini to get out of. Second, the White House may
44 See N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1990, at Al, col. 3, B7, col. 3.
45 The Recorder, Sept. 17, 1990, at 8, col. 4 (quoting Souter).
46 J. Ely, supra note 4, at 117.
47 But cf. N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1990, supra note 25 (Judge Souter indicating that his views
on the morality of abortion could not properly affect his views on Roe v. Wade); id. at col. I
(Souter expressing his view that judges "have not been placed upon courts in effect to impose
our will. We have been placed upon courts to impose the will that lies behind the meaning of
those who framed and, by their adoption, intended to impose ... constitutional law of this
country upon us all.").
48 See, e.g., id. at col. 5 (Senator Kennedy's pursuit of Souter's moral feelings with respect
to abortion).




simply have screwed up. Rudman is no arch-conservative, Sununu no
lawyer, and I doubt that Bork's conspicuous endorsement was even
unambiguously welcomed, let alone the product of crucial inside
information the rest of us lack.5" Third, even if David Souter doesn't
turn out to be an exact clone of, say, Antonin Scalia, there is no
strong reason to suppose George Bush is any more an exact clone of
Ronald Reagan when it comes to judicial appointments than he is
otherwise. Fourth, the appointment was not to just any seat, but to
that of Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. True, there was much liberal
claptrap when moderate Justice Lewis Powell retired, about how it
would be sacrilege to fill his seat with a conservative, but this time the
point51 was valid: Brennan had anchored the Court's liberal wing for
four decades. It is possible that this fact influenced Bush and his advi-
sors. Indeed, replacing a moderate justice with a conservative and,
later, a liberal with a moderate, seems exactly the course one might
reasonably expect from a moderately conservative President with
even a modicum of respect for judicial continuity.
However true that all may be, the Souter proceedings did not signal
a return to the legal process ideal and indeed probably helped solidify
the new wisdom that it is futile to pretend that one can judge potential
nominees on anything other than their politics. What's more, though
the specific incentives are likely to vary over time with changes in the
control of the executive branch and the Senate, the general incentive
system now in place seems unlikely to change for some time. Action
breeds reaction, and the next liberal Democrat elected President is not
likely to worry too much about judicial philosophy per se-we have
seen that the Democrats in Congress are hardly sticklers for legal pro-
cess-but rather to seek to redress what he will see as the political
imbalance wrought by his predecessors.
This alteration of the reward system is likely to have unfortunate
feedback effects on academia. The dream of high judicial appoint-
ment has probably always warped the work of constitutional law
professors to a degree. Back in the "lions of the bar" days, one sus-
pects it led mostly to the trimming of sails, thereby costing us some
scholarly creativity. Two things are different now. First, the appoint-
50 Cf. N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1990, at A18, col. 6 (Bork expressing surprise at some of
Souter's testimony).
51 In fact, we heard less about this point this time, presumably because wolf had been cried
on the earlier occasion.
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ments of Justices Scalia and Kennedy and the attempted elevation of
Judges Bork and Ginsburg, the first academics nominated for the
Supreme Court since 1943,52 may have rekindled similar dreams in
the bosoms of many law teachers. It's easy to see why presidents
interested in radical reform through the courts would be drawn to
professors: unaccustomed to the need for compromise and coming
from a profession that puts a premium on personal consistency, aca-
demics are likely to be more doctrinaire and thus more "reliable. 5 3
The "Schwab's Drugstore effect" 54 on scholarly writing for the next
few decades is not likely to be salutary, though."
The second difference is that, because of the changes in appoint-
ments criteria, the pressure is no longer toward maintaining a bal-
anced, common law judge's image-"I'm no ideologue; I'd decide
every case on its individual merits"-or even a consistent judicial phi-
losophy, but rather toward pleasing one of the standard political con-
stituencies. If you believe that the Court should not constitutionally
invalidate state laws mandating affirmative action, you had better take
the position that it should strike down state laws restricting abortion.
Contrariwise, if you are prepared to uphold anti-abortion laws, you
had better be prepared at the same time to invalidate affirmative
52 Wiley Rutledge was named that year. It's true he was a Circuit Court judge at the time
of his appointment to the Supreme Court, but so were the four I mentioned in the text: my
reference is to where the appointees in question had spent most of their careers, Felix
Frankfurter and William O. Douglas were both appointed in 1939, the former directly from
academia, the latter via a stint with the SEC.
53 It is difficult to postulate any other reason why Reagan would have been drawn to
academics. The last pre-Reagan President who seems to have cared greatly about precisely
how his nominees would rule, Franklin Roosevelt, was also the last pre-Reagan President to
favor professors.
54 Legend has it that once Lana Turner was "discovered" sipping a soda at Schwab's,
legions of lovelies took to hanging out there, sipping sodas and trying to look like Lana Turner.
55 In addition to the increased incentive toward overtly political "constitutional theories,"
the Schwab's phenomenon may exacerbate existing academic incentives not to build on, or
even to acknowledge merit in, the work of others. Instead, an author is likely to cite as
dispositive early criticism of the perceived rival, and then present his own theory (or, more
likely, to sketch the outline of his own theory, as some sinister outside force habitually decrees
that "this is not the place for a full presentation" of the author's own approach). Law teachers
are caught in something of a whipsaw here, in that academia generally rewards originality,
whereas the law generally rewards lack of originality-that is, the existence of precedent. The
tension thus created probably helps account for the common scholarly slalom in which the
author's theory is said to be immanent in a series of judicial decisions, though no prior
academic commentator has even come close to apprehending it. There is little professional
risk in acknowledging the possibility that certain judges may be idiot savants.
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action laws-even though neither position is easily reconcilable with
any coherent philosophy of judicial review that is not heavily depen-
dent on its purveyor's political preferences. 6 The pressure now, in
other words, is to make no enemies on, pick one, the political left or
the political right. (President Reagan appointed a remarkable per-
centage of the nation's conservative law teachers to the federal bench,
many of them quite young. Discovering you were a conservative in
1980 was like buying stock in Apple Computer the same year.)
Thus, the entire gang appears to be on board. "Overrule the flag
burning case," "Appoint Bork," and for that matter "Dump Bork,"
are all united in their message that the role of judges is no different
from that of other politicians. 7 I doubt that the unity of left and
right on this level surprises true believers on either side. The right
must be confident it can prevail for the foreseeable future, and for the
far left, it may be part of the long-term recipe for revolution. I can't
help but wonder, though, if liberals along for the ride really under-
stood what they were getting into.
56 One taking an "originalist" line might choose the latter combination and argue that,
whereas the Constitution has absolutely nothing to say on the subject of abortion, the
fourteenth amendment was intended to outlaw all racial classifications. It's a fair shot, but I
believe it fails. Neither the overall theory of the equal protection clause nor the specific
intentions of its framers suggest the unconstitutionality of laws discriminating in favor of
powerless minorities. See J. Ely, supra note 4, at 61-62, 170-72. (What one can say in favor of
the former combination, without resorting to some form of the claim that "these laws are good
and those are bad," is more elusive still.)
A combination popular for a time with those running for the Reagan Court was that laws
limiting campaign contributions should be invalidated under the first amendment, but that few
other laws should be.
57 I was asked after presenting a version of this Article as the Sibley Lecture whether it
constitutes a surrender. Certainly it is an admission that few people appear to agree with me,
and that is a surrender of sorts. However, this Article is intended to convey just as clearly the
idea that today's consensus is wrong-the suspicious may even suppose that to be its principal
point-and to suggest the likelihood that after a few decades the legal process ideal will
experience a renaissance.
Another Such Victory
II. MAYBE A "LEGISLATIVE JUDICIARY" IS OUR BEST HOPE FOR
A VIABLE SEPARATION OF POWERS, GIVEN CONGRESS'S
VANISHING ROLE AS A POLICY-MAKING FORCE
We are simply afraid to make any difficult decision& We're afraid
we'll make someone mad at us.
Congressman Ed Jenkins5"
You just don't see much good legislation anymore.
Former Governor Lester Maddox
In recent decades there has developed something approaching a
consensus among political scientists and other observers that Con-
gress has essentially lost the ability to function as a policy-making
alternative to the executive. One important factor has been the break-
down of party discipline. In the late twentieth century members of
Congress appear to regard the preferences of their party platform or
leaders as a sort of tie-breaker, to be consulted only when the repre-
sentative's particular constituent and other parochial interests do not
dictate a course of action.59 When this development is coupled with
the fact that in a complex institution like Congress it is considerably
easier to block initiatives than to push them through,' the results can
be dramatic.6"
Much of the fault lies in the related development, since the New
Deal, of a sort of congressional reelection assurance plan.62 Modern
58 The Politics of Anti-Politics, N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1990, at A24, col. 1 (editorial).
59 E.g., S. Smith, Call to Order: Floor Politics in the House and Senate (1989). The related
decline in party affiliation as an important determinant of elections has in turn contributed
further to the pressure incumbents feel to concentrate on constituent (and other interest group)
service. See M. Fiorina, Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment 112 (2d ed.
1989).
60 E.g., Choper, The Supreme Court and the Political Branches: Democratic Theory and
Practice, 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 810, 830-32 (1974); R. Dixon, Democratic Representation:
Reapportionment in Law and Politics 10 (1968).
61 The result of the combination is "a decentralized legislature, its fragmented party
coalitions guided by tolerant party leaders, that [is] best suited to trafficking in particularized
benefits." Jacobson, Running Scared: Elections and Congressional Politics in the 1980s, in
Congress: Structure and Policy 73 (M. McCubbins & T. Sullivan eds. 1987).
62 Although this characterization is mine, the system has been well documented by others.
E.g., M. Fiorina, supra note 59; G. Jacobson, The Politics of Congressional Elections chs. 7-8,
at 181-223 (2d ed. 1987); R. Davidson & W. Oleszek, Congress and Its Members 43-44 (3d ed.
1990). See generally T. Mann, Unsafe at Any Margin: Interpreting Congressional Elections
102 (1978) (examining link between electoral insecurity and accountability); D. Mayhew,
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congressmen follow a fairly standard recipe for survival6 3-a maxi-
mum of "casework," or particularized services for constituents" (and
other interest groups seen as critical to reelection 6 ) and a minimum
of "programmatic" or legislative activity.6
Congress: The Electoral Connection 53-59, 108-10 (1974) (discussing benefits of constituent
service).
A. Maass, Congress and the Common Good (1983), is a conspicuous presentation of the
view that Congress frequently seeks to act for the common good rather than merely
aggregating private preferences. However, Professor Maass is also clear to the effect that the
President is the dominant influence in the legislative process, whereas the legislature plays the
subservient role of criticism and "control." Id. at 10. "Control in this context means to
exercise a check upon executive leadership, to oversee it, to criticize and influence it, and to
approve, reject, or amend specific executive proposals." Id. at 11. See generally id. at 3-18
(modeling executive-legislative relations). (Various reforms of the early 1970s were calculated
to beef up Congress's influence vis-a-vis the executive, but as Maass points out, they failed. Id.
at 54-61.) In fact he makes the point that judicial examinations of "legislative history" would
be more realistic if they shifted their focus from statements made in various congressional
documents and debates to various records located in the executive branch, which is probably
where the law was originated, almost certainly where the various alternative approaches were
intelligibly weighed. Id. at 13-14. Maass's quarrel is thus with commentators like the early
Robert Dahl rather than with Fiorina et al.
63 Even the rare dissenter from the proposition that casework matters importantly to one's
chances of reelection agrees that congressmen think it does. Johannes & McAdams, The
Congressional Incumbency Effect: Is It Casework, Policy Compatibility, or Something Else?
An Examination of the 1978 Election, 25 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 512, 516-17 (1981).
64 See, e.g., B. Eckhardt & C. Black, The Tides of Power: Conversations on the American
Constitution 19-20 (1976); J. Ely, supra note 4, at 131; M. Fiorina, supra note 59, at 32-47, 53-
67, 72, 86-90; A. Maass, supra note 62, at 228-30; D. Mayhew, supra note 62; M. Parenti,
Democracy for the Few 195 (3d ed. 1980); Image of a Senator: D'Amato Sticks to Local
Interests, N.Y. Times, May 11, 1988, at B5, col. 5.
65 Fiorina takes account of the rapid growth in the influence of political action committees
in his second edition, and correctly notes that, although it would now be a mistake to describe
congressional casework as running only to the benefit of geographical constituents, the rise of
PACs serves only to reinforce his more general point. M. Fiorina, supra note 59, at 124-29.
66 In his second edition, Fiorina backs away from his earlier claim that the increase in
casework had resulted in a decrease of legislative activity and suggests that, with increases in
staff, it is possible that they both have been increasing. Id. at 91. He goes on to point out,
however, that despite the staff increases the quality of legislative work remains in serious
doubt. Id. at 91-92. Moreover, the statistical evidence that moved him on this issue-a
showing that between 1958 and 1978 positive constituent evaluations on the basis of the
representative's philosophy or ideology rose from 2% to 7%; on the basis of her stands on
domestic policy, from 3% to 5%; and on the basis of her foreign policy stands, from 0% to
1%-also showed that over the same period positive evaluations on the basis of her
attentiveness to her constituency rose from 11% to 25%. Id. at 89. Thus while one may not
have been purchased at the expense of the other, 25% is still a lot bigger than 13%. The
second edition also correctly cautions that the positive "policy" evaluations appear to have
been based more on "position taking" than on actual legislative activity. Id. at 92-93; see also
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Congressmen know that the specific impact of broad national policies
on their districts is difficult to see, that effects are hidden, so to
speak.... Thus, in order to attain reelection, congressmen focus on
things that are both more recognizable in their impact and more cred-
ible indicators of the individual congressman's power-federal
projects and individual favors for constituents.67
As the mix has shifted, the reelection rate has gone up enormously.68
Things titled statutes do still get passed, but what do they generally
comprise? Sometimes just more of the same, pork barrel and other
constituent service measures. 69 Legislation of broader import also
sometimes emerges,70 though it is likely to consist of an appropria-
tion71 for a new or existing bureaucracy, "controlled" by what
D. Mayhew, supra note 62, at 61-73 (discussing "position taking," the public enunciation of a
judgmental statement on anything likely to be of interest to political actors).
67 M. Fiorina, supra note 59, at 68-69.
68 Id. at 9; D. Mayhew, supra note 62, at 14. On the connection, see, e.g., id. at 57, 69; M.
Fiorina, supra note 59, at 35-36, 50-52. Admittedly, the existence of a strong causal
connection can be questioned. Johannes & McAdams, supra note 63. But see Fiorina, Some
Problems in Studying the Effects of Research Allocation in Congressional Elections, 25 Am. J.
Pol. Sci. 543 (1981) (rejecting findings of Johannes and McAdams); Yiannokos, The Grateful
Electorate: Casework and Congressional Elections, 25 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 568 (1981) (concluding
that constituent service is important to reelection prospects). For a response, see Johannes &
McAdams, Does Casework Matter? A Reply to Professor Fiorina, 25 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 581
(1981). The important point for purposes of this Article, however, is that congressmen
allocate their attentions on the assumption that there is one. See supra note 63.
69 Actually, Congress seems to be getting less effective at logrolling and pork-barrel
legislation (at least in up-front statutory form). See A. Maass, supra note 62, at 69. The
tendency is thus toward "formula grants," often "controlled" by vague admonitions and thus
respecting which the influence of members of Congress is more likely to be exerted at the
administrative level. See infra text accompanying notes 72-77.
70 Of course, Congress sometimes legislates in ways that are both quite directive and not
explainable in terms of a desire to promote the interests of particular sets of members'
constituents. The recent example most often cited is deregulation. See, e.g., M. Derthick & P.
Quirk, The Politics of Deregulation (1985). Actually, this isn't a very clear counterexample to
the Fiorina thesis-though it is to, say, the early Dahl-as leadership within the Ford and
Carter Administrations had a good deal to do with bringing deregulation about. But
counterexamples certainly are possible: if I believed otherwise, I would not have concluded this
Article as I have. See infra text accompanying notes 144-49.
71 Congress certainly exercises influence at the appropriations stage. Generally, however,
that influence is felt at the level, say, of eliminating (or restoring) a particular weapons system
as opposed to enacting or even proposing a competing general approach to an area such as
defense. One reason for this is that thinking big generally has been left of late for the executive
(and the judiciary). Another is that tinkering with the specifics of programs (including
weapons systems) seems often to spring from constituent interests and other personal political
agendas as opposed to any larger substantive vision. See, e.g., Owens, Micromanaging the
Defense Budget, 100 Pub. Interest 131 (Summer 1990); Uprising in the House: Members Said
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amounts to no more than an admonition to "take care of" this or that
problem.72 This combination in turn helps secure the framework for
the reelection assurance plan. "The existence of the Washington sys-
tem locks us into the New Deal way of doing things: pass a law,
appropriate a lot of money, and establish a new federal bureaucracy.
No reasoned analysis underlies that method of operation. The electo-
ral interest of incumbent congressmen does." 73
How so? Most obviously, such a "law," by saying next to nothing,
provides little by way of substantive content against which an incum-
bent's fitness for continuation in office can be measured. A statutory
injunction to "do something" risks few votes. Second, such open-
ended delegations leave maximum range for congressional scolding.
Once they see (or purport to see) how such a formless mandate is
being interpreted by those to whom they entrusted it, members are
free to retort--each in accord with what he takes to be the preferences
of his constituency-"That's not what we wanted you to do; indeed
it's nothing short of a betrayal of the American people." 74 Finally,
such unrestricted delegations give congressional committee chairper-
sons (and their staffs), and to a lesser degree other members of Con-
gress who happen to be interested, significant informal influence over
various executive branch interpretations75-infiuence that can be
No to Bush on Military Without a Grand Design of Their Own, N.Y. Times, July 29, 1989, at
Al, col. 4.
72 See, e.g., 122 Cong. Rec. 31,634 (1976) (statement of Rep. Levitas) ("When hard
decisions have to be made, we pass the buck to the agencies with vaguely worded statutes.");
Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 Yale L.J 1385, 1407-09 (1989)
(noting some 470 open-ended delegations to the President to deal with "emergencies"); T.
Lowi, The Personal President: Power Invested, Promise Unfulfilled 52 (1985); McDowell,
Congress and the Courts, 100 Pub. Interest 89, 93-94 (Summer 1990); Schoenbrod, Congress
Must Spell Out Where the Burdens of Clean Air Fall, Wall St. J., July 5, 1983, at 22, col. 3.
73 M. Fiorina, supra note 59, at 69.
74 Cf. 122 Cong. Rec. 31,622 (1976) (statement of Rep. Flowers):
[We stand back and say when our constituents are aggrieved or oppressed by various
rules and regulations, "Hey, it's not me. We didn't mean that. We passed this well-
meaning legislation, and we intended for those people out there... to do exactly what
we meant, and they did not do it."
See also, e.g., Baker, Not the Declaring Type, N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1990, at 23, col. 1 ("Later,
after the President has played the hand, Congress can revel in the wisdom of hindsight and
profit by passing crowd-pleasing judgments.").
75 Actually, as we persist in divided government (President from one party, majorities in
Congress from the other), this kind of influence on the part of the committee chairpersons
probably will diminish to some degree-though it will always be significant-as that of the
ranking minority members increases.
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heavily arrayed in support of the interests of one's geographical or
other types of "constituents" (but, again, does not entail negative
accountability).76
However, influence exercised in either of these ways-by unofficial
intervention into the enforcement process, or post facto allegation
that the legislative will immanent in the statute has been thwarted-
cannot be passed off as representing the judgment of "Congress";
rather, it will reflect the judgment and influence of a limited number
of well-placed individuals. Nor, of course, is it calculated to add up to
anything approaching a coherent policy judgment. Instead, it repre-
sents a series of ad hoc interventions by widely disparate persons,
sometimes in the service of perceptions of the public interest, often
quite flagrantly in the interests of their individual constituents. At
our luckiest, "[p]ublic policy emerges from the system almost as an
afterthought." ,77
76 As Professor Fiorina has noted:
The legislation is drafted in very general terms, so some agency, existing or newly
established, must translate a vague policy mandate into a functioning program, a
process that necessitates the promulgation of numerous rules and regulations and,
incidentally, the trampling of numerous toes. At the next stage, aggrieved and/or
hopeful constituents petition their congressman to intervene in the complex (or at least
obscure) decision processes of the bureaucracy. The cycle closes when the congressman
lends a sympathetic ear, piously denounces the evils of bureaucracy, intervenes in the
latter's decisions, and rides a grateful electorate to ever more impressive electoral
showings.
M. Fiorina, supra note 59, at 46-47; see also de Grazia, Congressional Liaison: An Inquiry into
its Meaning for Congress, in Congress: The First Branch of Government 297 (1966) (congres-
sional oversight of the administrative process); M. Fiorina, supra note 59, at 60-66 (suggesting
that the decentralization of congressional power enables individual members to control specific
policy decisions); Owens, supra note 71, at 141 (congressional oversight of the administrative
process); Rabkin, Micromanaging the Administrative Agencies, 100 Pub. Interest 116, 119
(1990) (same); R. Ripley, Congress: Process and Policy 251-52 (1st ed. 1975) (interaction
between Congress and the bureaucracy). See generally K. Shepsle, The Giant Jigsaw Puzzle:
Democratic Committee Assignments in the Modem House (1978) (study on committee assign-
ments finds that freshmen representatives seek assignments to those committees in which their
constituents have an important interest); A. Maass, supra note 62, at 40 (congressional over-
sight holds the bureaucracy accountable for administrative performance).
To give Congress its due, it did try to build a little more accountability into this routine by
the device of the legislative veto (though in the process it hastened the trend toward flabby
initial delegations). However, the legislative veto has been declared unconstitutional. INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
77 M. Fiorina, supra note 59, at 68. The system has "produced a Congress that [is]
inordinately responsive without being responsible." Jacobson, supra note 61, at 73.
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Sometimes the situation will be so sensitive politically that Con-
gress will be leery of delegating the power of effective decision to the
executive bureaucracy. What to do in such a case? An innocent
might expect that Congress would be moved to make the troublesome
decision or decisions itself-by passing some old-fashioned legislation,
complete with standards and everything. Congressional decision
entails congressional accountability, however, and thus an increas-
ingly popular gimmick has been created for this kind of case, whereby
the problem is passed off for effective decision by some third party.
The 1988 creation of the military base-closing commission 7 is a
recent textbook example of this, though it certainly was not without
precedent.79 The Salary Act of 19670 operates the same way, and
Congress's repeated refusals to make the Federal Reserve more
accountable politically are conventionally attributed to the fact that
the Fed spares Congress "the responsibility of making painful choices
about the economy." '' The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act8 2 was
similar, though perhaps a little sneakier, in that the effective decision
there was passed to the Comptroller General, whom Congress had
reason to believe was in some sense "their guy," but at the same time
wasn't so closely identified with them that they would have to take
the heat when he axed some of their constituents' favorite programs.8 3
78 See Congress Agrees on Closing Bases but Leaves the Choices to a Panel, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 13, 1988, at Al, col. 5.
79 One might wonder how these examples differ from the earlier creation of administrative
agencies to handle various problems. The answer is that the distinction is not sharp: a desire to
escape the political heat that comes with decision may have helped account for the creation of
such agencies as well. In most such cases, however, a seemingly larger element was a desire to
assign an entire set of problems to a group of "experts" who could study them over time and
develop more detailed and sengible solutions than Congress itself could: faith in expertise was
part of the New Deal religion. (In the recent instances I cite, the desire to escape
accountability plainly predominates.) To the extent I'm wrong about this distinction,
however, my broader point, unfortunately, is only reinforced.
80 2 U.S.C. §§ 351-364, as amended by Act of Dec. 19, 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-190, 135 Stat.
1322 (1985).
81 N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 1989, at Al, col. 4.
82 Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, 2 U.S.C. § 901 (1985).
83 The Supreme Court found unconstitutional this grant of executive power to an officer
over whom Congress had removal authority. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986). I
suppose we should be thankful that Congress doesn't have the full range of devices available to
some state legislatures. In 1988 the California legislature, immobilized by conflicting pressures
from two powerful interest groups (insurance companies and trial lawyers), placed on the
November ballot four mutually inconsistent automobile insurance initiatives so complex and
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The third party may also be the courts.84 Walter Murphy and
Joseph Tanenhaus have suggested that the Senate's "apparently illogi-
cal behavior ' 'as in rejecting judicial nominees (like Bork) who think
courts should generally defer to legislatures may be explainable in
these terms:
One explanation is that some senators were loath to accept such
power because it would have increased their responsibility-and
accountability-to constituents. It can be comforting to elected offi-
cials who face divisive issues like prayer in public schools, federal aid
to parochial schools, and abortion to wash their hands of the
problems by mournfully proclaiming that the Supreme Court has spo-
ken, wrongfully perhaps, but authoritatively. Thus, legislators can
express sympathy with individual constituents of all persuasions with-
out incurring heavy costs at the next election. 6
It briefly baffled me that everyone (advocates, critics, media alike)
treated the Supreme Court as the final authority on the content of
federal civil rights statutes. An observer who took the paper system
seriously would respond that such a view is unfair, as Congress can
always overrule an interpretation of a statute by amending it-it's not
as if the Constitution were implicated. The answer, of course, is that
by now we all know perfectly well that, whichever way the Court
holds, the odds are extremely low that Congress is going to overrule
it.17 Thus, although the matter is "statutory," the Court is likely to
be the last word. The last legally effective word, I should say: there
will be plenty of scolding by individual members, generally with the
television cameras rolling.
overlapping that the Stanford torts faculty was unable to explain either to their satisfaction, or
to that of the rest of us, how even a person fairly clear of her goals should vote on them.
84 Of course every delegation to the executive or an administrative agency is indirectly a
delegation to the courts that review their actions, but sometimes Congress "cuts out the
bureaucratic middleman" and makes its delegation directly to the judicial system. See
McDowell, supra note 72, at 93-94.
85 Murphy & Tanenhaus, Publicity, Public Opinion, and the Court, 84 Nw. U. L. Rev. 985,
986 (1990).
86 Id. at 986-87 (footnote omitted).
87 The reasons here are various, including not only a desire to let the court system take the
heat, but also, as noted earlier, the fact that it is easier to block legislation than to enact it.
There are, of course, rare exceptions, such as Congress's amendment of Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972, Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259,
102 Stat. 28 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (1988)), in reaction to the Court's statutory holding
in Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
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Occasionally Congress will summon the courage to assign to itself
the effective decision authority regarding problems it knows it has
been ducking, and to seek to build in procedural safeguards to prevent
its continuing to do so. The War Powers Resolution of 197388 has
been its most notable effort along these lines, in my opinion an admi-
rable one. Unfortunately, the experience under the Resolution has
been that when push has come to shove, Congress has lacked the har-
dihood to hang in there and take the heat.8 9
I am not arguing that Congress has lost the ability to make life
miserable for the President. It still knows how to get in the way; the
Senate's refusal to confirm Justice-designate Bork and both houses'
refusal to enact a constitutional flag burning amendment are conspic-
uous recent examples. A willingness thus to obstruct might well on
occasion prove a useful bulwark against tyranny. 90 It should be
noted, though, that in each of the cited instances, Congress's affirma-
tive approval of the executive's plan was inescapably required. Such
occasions are rare, however, given the existence of so many broad
delegations to the executive, whether actually granted by -Congress or
simply acquiesced in. And Congress's willingness to become involved
where there exists an even vaguely articulable option not to has been
highly restricted of late. The contribution it is able to make toward
insuring that the policy judgments enforced for and against the Amer-
ican people represent the combined judgment of a group of persons
(some of whom are not beholden to the President), has thus become
very questionable. 91 "[Congress] can act negatively, to disrupt the
0
88 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1988).
89 See, e.g., Ely, Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act That Worked, 88 Colum. L.
Rev. 1379, 1380-83 (1988); cf. Cole, Book Review, 99 Yale L.J. 2063, 2078-79 (1990) (similar
experience under National Emergencies Act of 1976).
90 Those who find the distinction helpful might say that the "system of checks and
balances" is working-to a degree at any rate-even if the "separation of powers" is not.
91 It has reached the point where senators and representatives, without any evident sense of
irony, can scold the executive for not having come up with a legislative program to deal with
one or another pressing problem. See A. Maass, supra note 62, at 15, 170 (citing examples);
Schoenbrod, How the Reagan Administration Trivialized Separation of Powers (and Shot
Itself in the Foot), 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 459, 460 (1989).
Presidents are loath to point out the irony here, as they are entirely satisfied with a Congress
that does not regard policy initiative as part of its job. Cf. Ely, The American War in
Indochina, Part II: The Unconstitutionality of the War They Didn't Tell Us About, 42 Stan.
L. Rev. 1093, 1123 (1990) ("For the latter half of the twentieth century, a tacit deal has existed
between the President and Congress: He'll take the responsibility as long as he can make the
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policy the President pursues, but it cannot act affirmatively to carry
out a comprehensive substitute policy of its own, even if through
structural reform it could develop the capacity to create it."92
Of course the disappearance of Congress even here, as an independ-
ent influence on federal policy, has not been complete. There's enough
of a trend, however, to suggest that we have a problem with respect to
the separation of powers. Hence the further suggestion of this Part's
title: perhaps it is a good thing that the federal courts generally, and
the Supreme Court in particular, are being urged on all sides to drop
the pretense that they shouldn't behave like legislators. Given Con-
gress's vanishing act,93 this development may represent our best hope
of providing an effective policy counterbalance to the President for
the foreseeable future. 94 (In particular, liberal supporters of the devel-
opment might be moved by the fact that at least for the time being our
presidents are coming from the right half of the political spectrum.)
Might what's happening not make sense as a way of providing a lib-
eral counterweight, perhaps indeed our best contemporary hope of
approximating the sort of balanced system the framers envisioned?
decisions, and it will live with a lack of power as long as it doesn't have to be held
accountable.").
92 J. Sundquist, The Decline and Resurgence of Congress 306 (1981). Despite a good deal
of post-Vietnam bravado, this pattern has persisted in the foreign policy area as well. "[Miost
of the major post-Vietnam foreign policy initiatives, from detente under President Nixon to
global anti-Sovietism under Reagan, still emanated from the executive. When Congress acted,
it was to revise, endorse, or prohibit foreign policy proposals initiated by the executive
branch." C. Arnson, Crossroads: Congress, the Reagan Administration, and Central America
12 (1989).
93 Perhaps this development is not as recent as I have painted it. Elements of it have surely
existed for a long time, e.g., A. Maass, supra note 62, at 45-63, as have advocates (and
specimens) of an overtly political judiciary. I have argued that as of 1991 we are witnessing a
coincidence of "high" stages on each cycle. If you think I'm wrong about that, though-it is
always difficult to place the present in historical context-please feel free to regard this as
simply a rhetorical device. Even if each of these developments dated back to the dawn of the
republic, the textual suggestion to which this footnote is appended might still be made (more
forcefully, one would suppose)-and it would still be emphatically rebuttable.
94 Cf. E. Bronner, supra note 28, at 352:
There is an irony to the fact that fewer and fewer Americans participate in the political
process, yet they turned out in massive numbers to play a role in the Bork controversy.
Since the work of the Supreme Court has come to provide so much of the framework for
social policy issues, democracy-in which citizens make choices through public debate,
local referenda, and elected representatives-was replaced with a substitute form:
debate over a nominee to the Supreme Court.
See also R. Bork, supra note 30, at 3 (instructive that pro-choice and anti-abortion demonstra-
tors tend to picket the White House and the Supreme Court, but not Congress).
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III. FAT CHANCE
There are two objections to this suggestion, one theoretical and
debatable, the other practical and dispositive.
A. Objection One: The Suggestion Is Wrong in Principle, as the
Alternative Policy-Making Center Should Be
Democratically Selected
1. First Rejoinder: Says Who?
In my opinion an entirely convincing argument can be made that it
would be inconsistent with the overall theory of our Constitution,
particularly as it has evolved by amendment over the past 150 years,
for one of our principal policy-making organs to be unelected.95 It is
obvious, however, that most contemporary commentators are not
convinced, as they argue either openly for an appointed judiciary that
enforces its own values in the name of the Constitution, or for what
will amount to the same thing, judicial enforcement of the values held
by "society" (albeit, mysteriously, not by its elected representatives). 96
It is true that this disagreement with Objection One is never made
explicit. The commentators do not, for example, admit (let alone pro-
claim) that what they are actually proposing is a version of the old
idea of "mixed government," a combination of democracy and oligar-
chy, as developed in the writings of such theorists as Locke and Mon-
tesquieu. Given that these two men are conventionally recognized as
important influences on the framers, one might wonder why not,97 but
of course the answer is obvious: "undemocratic" has become a dirty
word in this country, to the point where even its approximate invoca-
tion would be rhetorical suicide. "In essence, there are two choices:
abandon the term democracy as the major premise in analysis or rede-
fine it to portray accurately the nature of government embodied in the
Constitution. Because the former is improbable, the latter is essen-
tial."'98  Thus, the position is wrapped in gobbledygook-generally
stressing how democratic it is to have an unelected judiciary superim-
95 The argument is made in J. Ely, supra note 4, chs. 1 & 4. It entirely convinced its author.
96 See id. at ch. 3.
97 Of course the Senate was originally conceived as something of an aristocratic
counterbalance to the "democratic" House of Representatives, though the ratification of the
seventeenth amendment in 1913 probably interred that rationale once and for all.
98 Chemerinsky, supra note 18, at 76.
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posing "our" values on the decisions of our elected representa-
tives9 9 -but it prevails nonetheless. Down deep most commentators
simply do not agree that our principal policy-making organs must be
democratically selected.
2. Second Rejoinder: Given the Changes in the Appointments
Process, the Suggested Model Is a Good Deal More
"'Democratic" Than It Used to Be
Federal judges have always been appointed by one elected official
and confirmed by a bunch of other elected officials (since 1913,
directly elected officials). During periods when the judge's job was
widely conceived as involving something other than the ordinary
political skills, however, it would have been difficult to maintain that
this method of selection rendered federal judges "democratic offi-
cials." Indeed, again precisely because of the then-prevailing assump-
tion that judges weren't just another set of politicians, even state
judges who were actually elected (and reelected) by the people were
not regarded until recently as democratic officials in the usual sense.
Only rarely, for example, were they turned out of office for unpopular
decisions: 1°° Rose Bird had to stand for reelection in a way that Roger
Traynor never did.101
What it was about Felix Frankfurter that supposedly "fooled"
Franklin Roosevelt was the "legal process" joker, the assumption that
there are times when one may strongly disapprove of a law without
99 An unusually circular version of the point-that no one could deny that the United
States is a democracy, yet the United States Constitution (as construed by the commentator)
incorporates a value-imposing judiciary-is rediscovered by every generation. E.g., E.
Rostow, The Sovereign Prerogative ch. 5 (1962); Bishin, Judicial Review in Democratic
Theory, 50 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1099, 1112 (1977); Chemerinsky, supra note 18, at 77 ("[I]f one
defines 'democratic' more broadly to reflect the actual nature of decisionmaking, all
government institutions are, at least, somewhat 'democratic' ....").
100 See Hall, Progressive Reform and the Decline of Democratic Accountability: The
Popular Election of State Supreme Court Judges, 1850-1920, 1984 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 345,
362-65; J. Hurst, supra note 39, at 130-34.
101 We now kick our state judges out of office-I'm assuming that in this as in so much else,
California is where the future happens first-and reelect 97% of our congressmen. I don't
believe it's because they're better; instead I would suggest it's because both "branches" have
evolved to the point where members of Congress have less to do with difficult and conspicuous
political choices. (Incumbent governors, faced with tougher and more visible choices as
Washington provides less and less financial help, have also become politically very vulnerable.
See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1990, at Al col. 4.)
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being prepared to declare it unconstitutional." °2 Once that joker is
expelled from the deck, however, as both recent presidents and the
Senate Judiciary Committee have indicated they intend to do, the deal
is changed somewhat. Candidates whose political views have been
thoroughly checked, and who then have been all but required to
pledge that they will enforce those political views in the name of the
Constitution, can be said-in an admittedly limited sense, but one
that would not have rung true before-to have been "democratically"
selected. (The Secretary of Labor isn't elected either, but she is cer-
tainly a "political" official, and we fully expect her to behave like
one.) On the other hand, federal judges still do not have to stand for
reelection-nor, unlike the Secretary of Labor, do they have a boss
who must-a fact that renders them significantly less "accountable to
the people" than they otherwise would be. 10 3 So this second rejoinder
102 I'm not sure this account is correct. Roosevelt was not clearly a civil libertarian. At all
events he was focusing on issues of federal power, on which Frankfurter's constitutional (as
well as his political) views were well known and reliable. See also supra note 24 (discussing
Roosevelt's appointment of Frankfurter).
103 On my approach, this difference is crucial. See supra note 4. Some might ask at this
point whether members of the House of Representatives really have to stand for reelection any
more, given that 98% of them were reelected in both 1986 and 1988, 96% in 1990, a year in
which virtually all the pundits predicted a sizeable anti-incumbent backlash. For discussion of
this question, see Tushnet, Schneider & Kovner, Judicial Review and Congressional Tenure:
An Observation, 66 Tex. L. Rev. 967 (1988). It's a fair question, but three observations are in
order:
(1) Despite the statistics, congressmen worry about reelection. E.g., Jacobson, supra note
61; T. Mann, supra note 62. (This is hardly a surprise: other officials, such as governors,
senators, and presidents, certainly have to worry about reelection-on senators, see, e.g.,
Dixon, The Power of Incumbency is a Myth, N.Y. Times, June 12, 1990, at A21 col. 2-and
congressmen are not so coldly rational and self-confident as to sharply distinguish their own
situation. Even at law schools that routinely grant tenure, people without tenure worry about
getting tenure. Cf. R. Fenno, Home Style: House Members in Their Districts (1978)
(recounting incumbent concern about reelection). This concern (whatever the actual statistical
probabilities) is what gives congressmen incentives to take steps to adjust the process, or
perhaps to ally themselves with constituent majorities in ways that unjustifiably disadvantage
minorities, so as to ensure their reelection.
(2) It turns out that one of the few things that actually does affect an incumbent's chances
of reelection, redistricting (see Tushnet, Schneider, and Kovner, supra, at 979), is on my
theory the paradigm example of something the courts should carefully police. The argument
of the cited article surely should qualify broadside allusions to "the countermajoritarian
difficulty," and it points the way for much relevant research. While I don't pretend to have
fully assimilated its implications (any more than its authors do), its negative implications for
my own work seem (to me, and therefore predictably) attenuated. Indeed, my reaction to the
authors' review of the actual occasions of judicial intervention was that in general the Court
had been intervening roughly as Democracy and Distrust would have them intervene, where
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also is attenuated, but it cannot be dismissed entirely: given the
changes in the selection system, judges are now closer to "ordinary
politicians" than they used to be. The "argument from democracy"
against the evolving "new separation of powers" thus' may be one that
I find convincing, but admittedly under present conditions it is
debatable.
B. Objection Two: The Court Won't Provide an Effective
Counterbalance to the Power of the President
The Supreme Court has certainly held its own over the past 200
years; indeed, its influence has for the most part grown quite stead-
ily.1° That does not mean, however, that it is realistic to suppose that
it can fill the vacuum left by the disappearance of Congress as an
effective policy counterbalance to the executive. The more serious the
Court becomes about presenting itself as a policy-making alternative
to the President, or for that matter the more it is seen as playing that
role, the more the President will be induced (and to a degree has
already been induced) to apply the screws.10 5 And, because of his
Congress appears to have been monkeying with the process so as to ensure the continued
incumbency of its members (reapportionment, campaign finance, political speech), or reflecting
a skewed version of its actual constituency (gender discrimination). See Tushnet, Schneider &
Kovner, supra, at 987-90.
(3) Finally, one of the principal reasons there are so few electoral rejections of incumbent
congressmen is that they have effectively taken themselves out of the business of legislating.
See supra text accompanying notes 61-94; Tushnet, Schneider, and Kovner, supra, at 977-78;
see also M. Fiorina, supra note 59, at 7 (average congressional turnover per election in 19th
century was 40-50%). It is the point of the instant Article that the proper role of the courts is
not to take the business of legislating over for them but rather to get them back into it. In
particular, see infra text accompanying notes 148-49.
104 Unlike Congress, the Supreme Court's agreement is never affirmatively required before a
given policy can take effect. See supra text accompanying notes 90-92. However, again unlike
Congress-and probably contrary to what most observers would abstractly describe as the
contemplated system-the Court has not in general proved hesitant to involve itself in
controversies it retains the legal discretion to avoid.
105 Thus, Professor Kamisar has suggested that the reason appointments to the Supreme
Court have become more political in recent years is that they now are seen as more important
than they used to be, which change in perception is presumably related to changes in judicial
behavior:
The modem view . . . is that a president should get his pick once you satisfy
considerations of ability, integrity and competence. People only recently have made a
contrary argument. But it never came to a test before because presidents really never
gave that much weight to ideology. With all respect, a Supreme Court appointment was
not considered that important until 20 years ago.
Quoted in Wash. Post, July 1, 1987, at A9, col. 2.
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vastly larger staff (this is what we call an understatement), his singu-
lar access to the media-and, if I may be permitted to mention it, the
fact that he is an elected official-he will inevitably dominate.
L Control by Overrule?
Though overrule by constitutional amendment may be the most
obvious method of controlling the Supreme Court, we can say quite
confidently as of 1991 that it is not an effective one. In 1980 1 wrote:
"Our recent experience with the Equal Rights Amendment, endorsed
by both major parties and hardly advancing a radical proposition,
corroborates the difficulty of amending the Constitution. In all our
history only four decisions of the Supreme Court have been reversed
by constitutional amendment." 10 6 Just one in this century 10 7 (and
that one essentially invited by the Court01 ), I might have added. I
thought for sure I was going to have to eat these words-in fact the
first draft of this Article did so-in light of the recent flag burning
brouhaha. President Bush's swift rhetorical onslaught on Texas v.
Johnson 10 9 had quite effectively forced almost every member of Con-
gress to choose between (a) agreeing with him that the first amend-
ment should be amended, and (b) taking the courageous "opposing"
position (which "prevailed" over Bush's token disagreement) that
before we amend the Constitution we should pass a new and slightly
different statute outlawing flag burning, in the hope that the Supreme
Court would also be intimidated and change its mind. As of the pas-
sage of the Flag Protection Act of 1989, I would have given approxi-
mately even odds that the Supreme Court would engineer a "switch in
time," and about nine-to-one that if it didn't, Congress would cave in
and vote to amend the Constitution in the way the President wanted.
106 J. Ely, supra note 4, at 46.
107 The eleventh amendment overruled Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793);
the fourteenth, Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857); the sixteenth, Pollock v.
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895); and the twenty-sixth, Oregon v. Mitchell,
400 U.S. 112 (1970).
108 The twenty-sixth amendment was a development that Justice Black's opinion
announcing the judgment of the Court in Mitchell quite clearly (and I have no doubt
knowingly) invited, by leaving states that wanted to deny the vote to eighteen-year-olds the
onerous task of enforcing one set of voter qualifications for federal elections, and another for
state elections.
109 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
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Well, neither of them caved,11° God bless 'em.11 Wrapping himself
in the flag may have helped President Bush defeat Governor Dukakis,
but it wasn't enough to pull off a constitutional amendment. And if
Old Glory can't do it, what can?
2. Control by Appointments?
Though on the surface one might expect the appointments power to
be a relatively effective control mechanism, historically its utility also
has proved to be limited: "It has ... proved hard to predict how
someone in another line of work will function as a justice and one
sometimes wonders whether the appointee who turns out differently
from the way the President who appointed him expected is not the
rule rather than the exception." ' The possibility of surprise can
never be entirely eliminated. I suspect, however, that the recent
changes in the appointments process we have noted have done much
to alter this assessment (which was published the year Ronald Reagan
was first elected President). As indicated, there seems to be more con-
centration now than before on how the candidate is likely to vote on
various issues. 13 Moreover, candidates now are much less frequently
involved in any functional sense "in another line of work." All five of
the post-Nixon appointees to the Supreme Court (plus the two Rea-
gan nominees who didn't make it) were, at the time, members of Fed-
eral Circuit Courts of Appeal.1 14 This represents quite a dramatic
shift. 5 History strongly supports what common sense would have
110 United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990); 136 Cong. Rec. H4087 (daily ed. June
21, 1990); 136 Cong. Rec. S8719, S8736-37 (daily ed. June 26, 1990).
111 Clowns like Johnson and Eichman have gotten enough attention without our providing
them another, still brighter, spotlight.
112 J. Ely, supra note 4, at 47; see also, e.g., Friedman, supra note 36, at 1291-1302 (the
ideological stance of a Justice, especially over the long run, is often difficult to predict at the
time of nomination).
I"13 See supra text accompanying notes 21-24; cf. J. Ely, supra note 4, at 207 n.18 ("At least
with the benefit of hindsight, it seems in general the 'fault' [underlying "mistaken"
appointments] has lain in the limited sophistication of the appointive authority's predictive
apparatus rather than in any drastic change in the appointee.").
114 True, Judge Souter hadn't yet actually decided any cases as a member of the First
Circuit Court of Appeals, but he had served seven years on the New Hampshire Supreme
Court.
115 From the dawn of the republic through Nixon, 103 men served on the Supreme Court
(counting Hughes twice): only 37 of them (or 36%) came from lower courts, federal or state
(counting Hughes, whose prior service was on the the Supreme Court, and Thurgood
Marshall, who came from the Solicitor Generalship but previously had served on the Second
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suggested, that persons who have already served as judges make
vastly more predictable justices.116  (Also, as I alluded to above, 117
even for lower court appointments, President Reagan favored aca-
demics-who for the reasons cited tend to be more predictable than
practitioners or politicians.) Finally, the apparent elimination of the
legal process "joker" has enormously enhanced predictability.1 ' The
behavior of candidates who have been induced to assure the adminis-
tration (and the Judiciary Committee) that they will make no nice
distinctions between their political views and their judicial philosophy
is much easier to anticipate.
Of course the Senate may not just roll over. On two occasions since
1930-specifically in 1970 and 1987-it has voted not to confirm the
President's first choice. 119 Each of these cases was, however, in some
sense special. Judge Bork had devoted a career to becoming the most
confrontational conservative on the block (a distinction that both
made and unmade him). The rejection of Judge Haynsworth is more
complicated, but much of the opposition had little to do with Hayn-
sworth himself, resulting instead from a combination of liberal frus-
tration that Abe Fortas had not become Chief Justice two years
Circuit). There was, moreover, remarkable stability over time. From the turn of the 20th
century through Nixon, the figures were 44 and 15 (34%); for Franklin Roosevelt through
Nixon, 25 and 9 (36%). Prior to Reagan and Ford (who went one for one) the only "hundred
percenters" (counting both state and federal judges) were Jefferson (three for three), Arthur
(two for two), Tyler, and John Quincy Adams (both one for one). For collections of these and
similar statistics on the Supreme Court, see A. Blaustein & R. Mersky, The First One Hundred
Justices: Statistical Studies on the Supreme Court of the United States (1978); Congressional
Quarterly, Guide to the U.S. Supreme Court (E. Witt 2d ed. 1990).
116 Thus of the 22 "surprises" Professor Friedman discusses (Story, McLean, Baldwin,
Taney, Swayne, Miller, Davis, Field, Salmon Chase, Holmes, Day, McReynolds, Stone,
Hughes, Reed, Frankfurter, Burton, Vinson, Clark, Warren, White, and Blackmun),
Friedman, supra note 36, at 1292-1301, only three had previously served on federal courts and
three on state courts. (I am again counting Hughes, as his "surprising" tenure apparently was
his second!)
117 See supra text accompanying notes 52-53.
11 Cf. Friedman, supra note 36, at 1303 (suggesting that presidential inability to control the
direction of the Court has resulted partly from "the relatively slight emphasis placed on
ideology by some Presidents").
119 In 1968 a combination of ethical problems forced President Johnson's choice to succeed
Earl Warren as Chief Justice, Associate Justice Abe Fortas, to withdraw his name from
consideration. (The next year he resigned from the bench entirely, upon disclosure of receipt
of money from a financier under indictment.)
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earlier ° and displaced opposition to Nixon's appointee to that posi-
tion, Warren Burger, who had been regarded as somewhat Borkian
himself."2 ' (Burger had been Nixon's first appointment and may for
that reason have received some extra deference. 122)
The easy confirmation of Judge Souter-despite the combination of
administration assurances that he was all that conservative Republi-
cans could hope for, and Democratic control of the Senate and its
Judiciary Committee-corroborates the proposition that the Senate
has no taste for frequent opposition. Indeed, the idea was originally
floated that although it was entirely appropriate to ask nominees (like
Bork) to explain discussions of current legal issues they had published
in law reviews and elsewhere, it would somehow be improper to ask
nominees (like Souter) who hadn't published what they thought about
the very same issues. (The notion was thus to transpose the existence
of a "paper trail" from an evidentiary liability, a repository of possible
prior inconsistent statements, to a prerequisite to asking any questions
at all about live legal issues. 123) This is, if anything, upside down, in
that nominees who have not commented publicly are precisely those
the Senate needs to question if it is to learn anything. And while I
certainly am not suggesting we should make publication a necessary
qualification for judicial office, God save us if we should make it a
disqualification.
Thus, that ground rule, while bruited early, faded soon, but was
quickly replaced by another that was every bit as nonsensical, though
more limited in scope. Although it was never phrased in precisely
these terms, this Committee acceded to what amounted to the issu-
ance of a "free pass" to the nominee to pick one issue respecting
which it would be "improper to comment" because it was likely to
come before the Court. As is well known, Souter picked abortion. He
120 See Freund, Appointment of Justices: Some Historical Perspectives, 101 Harv. L. Rev.
1146, 1155-56 (1988).
121 Compare (Circuit Judge) Burger, What to Do About Crime in U.S., U.S. News & World
Rep., Aug. 7, 1967, at 70, with (Professor) Bork, Why I Am For Nixon, New Republic, June
1, 1968, at 19.
122 This may also help account for Souter's having had an easy time getting through. I
hesitate to push the point too hard, however, because while it is true that no President since
Cleveland has had his first nominee to the Court rejected, a total of only five nominees overall
since then (counting Ginsburg) have gone down to defeat.
123 See, e.g., Lewis, Souter and Senate: How Far Should Questions Go?, N.Y. Times, July
26, 1990, at A16, col. 1.
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shared with the Committee his views on affirmative action, 124 capital
punishment, 125 the Miranda rule, 126 and the authority of federal
courts to order states to raise their taxes in order to fund the enforce-
ment of federal rights. 2 7 These issues, like abortion, all come before
the Court year after year for clarification of a controversial principle
it has previously established; lurking perpetually in each of their back-
grounds is the question of whether the principle itself should be
reconsidered. However, Souter was "sure the Senators would under-
stand" that it would be improper for him to comment on abortion, at
which point the senators would nod sagely and agree that they cer-
tainly didn't want to be a party to anything improper.'28 Certain sen-
ators went so far as to praise Souter for his courage in taking this
stand. Arlen Specter, often lauded for having bested Bork by acute
cross-examination, 129 indicated early on that it was "a tribute to
Judge Souter's character that he took the position that he would not
come to Washington to be interviewed for this position if he was
going to be asked" his views on Roe v. Wade.'30 Chairman Biden,
also admiringly, may have come closer in assessing to what Souter's
position was a tribute:
Senator Biden suggested that Judge Souter, who at every turn por-
trayed himself as a pragmatist, was simply taking the pragmatic
course.
124 See N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1990, at A18, col. 4; N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1990, at A24, col.
3.
125 See N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1990, at B7, col. 2.
126 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); see also N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1990, at Al, B7,
col. 1 (noting that Souter strongly defended Miranda during his testimony).
127 That is, the rule of Missouri v. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. 1651 (1990). See N.Y. Times, Sept.
19, 1990, at A24, col. 3. Judge Souter also suggested during the hearings that white collar
criminals should be incarcerated following a first offense more often than they are now. See
N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1990, at 10, col. 5 (Senator Kennedy referring to this point, made in
earlier testimony by Souter).
128 See, e.g., infra note 132.
129 It doesn't come across that way from the transcript, but since I was just about as far
away as anyone could get at the time without leaving the planet-in the Maldives, under about
90 feet of water-I guess I'll have to take the word of those who watched it on television.
When Souter's name was originally put forward by the President, Specter vowed to put him
"under the microscope," N.Y. Times, July 24, 1990, at A19, col. I, and was identified by the
Times as one of the two "expected to be the most vigorous Senators in seeking precise answers
from Judge Souter." N.Y. Times, July 26, 1990, at A16, col. 3.
130 Quoted in N.Y. Times, July 27, 1990, at A12, col. 4.
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"If he said he was for it, Biden would be satisfied, and [Senator
Charles] Grassley would go into orbit .... If he said he wasn't, it
would be the opposite. A nomination that was not in trouble would
then be in trouble no matter what he said."'131
Whatever lay behind it, this "one-issue-pass" approach worked: 132
Souter was confirmed, ninety to nine. Since it so evidently makes no
principled sense whatever, 3 3 we should ask why the Democratic-con-
131 Nat'l L. J., Oct. 1, 1990, at 3, col. 3 (quoting Biden referring to himself and to Senator
Grassley).
132 On occasion Souter's flashing of his free pass was amalgamated with a claim that he
hadn't really given the matter of Roe v. Wade much thought. This prompted the following
September 14 interchange with Senator Herb Kohl:
[Q.] [D]o you recall your feelings about Roe v. Wade back when it was promulgated?
[A.] I frankly don't remember the early discussions on it. I mean, everybody was
arguing it....
[Q.] You had no-you had no opinion about it than just to say, "Wow"?
[A.] Oh, I doubtless-I doubtless had an opinion. No, I didn't just say wow.
[Q.] What was your opinion in 1973 on Roe v. Wade?
[A.] Well, with respect, Senator, I'm going to ask you to let me draw the line there ....
[Q.] O.K. With respect to Roe v. Wade just once more, is it fair to state even though
you're not prepared to discuss it, understandably, that you do have an opinion on Roe
v. Wade?
[A.] It-I think it would be misleading to say that. I have not got any agenda on what
should be done with Roe v. Wade if that case were brought before me.
I will listen to both sides of that case. I have not made up my mind.
Quoted in N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1990, at 10, col. 3. Before his nomination, Justice Souter
served as Attorney General of New Hampshire, on the New Hampshire Supreme Court, and,
briefly, on the First Circuit Court of Appeals. He also apparently fills his free time with schol-
arly reflection upon the problems of his profession. As Professor Levinson noted in 1981,
though: "Roe v. Wade was undoubtedly the most important constitutional decision of the past
decade .... Not to have views on Roe v. Wade is equivalent to not having views on the nature
of the Constitution itself or on the nature of the Supreme Court's role in a constitutional
system." Levinson, Should Supreme Court Nominees Have Opinions?, 233 Nation 375, 375
(1981). Souter's added twist is thus perhaps best read as an indication-and indeed this is
what he seems to say-that while he (naturally) had a (privileged) opinion of whether Roe v.
Wade was correct as a matter of constitutional interpretation, he is undecided about whether it
should be overruled. Aside from the claim of privilege, this strikes me as an entirely under-
standable position, albeit one-did no one pick this up?-that unmistakably signals his view of
Roe. (Whether a correct decision should be overruled is not ordinarily a question that gives
one pause.)
133 Of course a nominee should refuse to answer questions about particular pending cases:
nobody disputes that. She should also feel free to indicate when she has not thought through a
particular subject (though the claim here should be credible). She should feel free as well to
point out that a judge's view of various issues is likely to be importantly affected by the
substantive and procedural peculiarities of the cases in which they arise, and that any judge,
herself included, is entitled, in fact duty-bound, to change her earlier views on a subject should
counsel or her colleagues convince her she should. It would also be a principled, if highly
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trolled Judiciary Committee and Senate went along with it. Sure,
Souter looked better than the Democrats had expected, but it may
be-the point is we don't know-that he looked that way because he
was permitted to pick the one issue they had advertised as critical
going in and, by fiat, to shield his views on it. The more convincing
explanation thus seems to be that the Bork affair was not yet three
years past, and the Senate simply lacked the stomach for another don-
nybrook so soon. 134 In order to protect their incumbency, though, it
apparently seemed wiser not to push Souter very hard on Roe than to
run the risk that he would come out against it and thus turn up the
political heat. If you're planning to roll over, you don't want to ask
too many questions: better to spend your allotted time suggesting that
the nominee visit an Indian reservation.1 35
Of course, the Senate is not likely always to be so docile as it proved
in Souter's case; it will recurrently decide to "get tough" with a nomi-
nee. But even that isn't likely to matter much (except to the ritual
victims), as the Senate's idea of getting tough these days is to pester,
and the President can be pretty sure that he will ultimately be able to
appoint someone whose predicted performance is not importantly dif-
ferent from that of his first choice. 136 The Senate, and anti-adminis-
debatable, position to refuse to offer any opinion that might prove relevant to some future case.
(Taken seriously, of course, this would mean basically that no nominee should testify to much
of anything beyond her name, rank, and serial number, suggesting that a nominee thus
disposed might better refuse altogether to appear. On the other hand, Justice O'Connor
attempted to take, and by and large succeeded in taking, a position very close to this at her
confirmation hearings. See Rees, Questions for Supreme Court Nominees at Confirmation
Hearings: Excluding the Constitution, 17 Ga. L. Rev. 913, 950-51 (1983).) It does not,
however, seem consistent to share one's opinions about a number of contested questions of law
that we all know perfectly well will come before the Court during the nominee's prospective
tenure, but to withhold one's opinions about other such questions (or one other such question).
When the opinion withheld respects what the nominee has reason to believe is the subject the
committee regards as most relevant to her confirmability, the drama builds. Convincing the
committee that withholding that particular opinion (but not others) is somehow required by
the ethics of our profession provides a final confirmation of the nominee's mastery of the
situation.
134 Of course, Justice Kennedy-Bork's ultimate replacement-had also been easily
confirmed. See infra text accompanying notes 137-40.
135 See N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1990, at A12, col. 6.
136 See also 3 Bork Hearings, supra note 29, at 2927 (testimony of Professor Henry
Monaghan); E. Bronner, supra note 28, at 325 (remarks of Sen. Robert Dole to an aide: "'I've
been talking to folks on the floor, particularly Southern Democrats. They see a no vote as a
no-lose proposition. They can please blacks, women, liberals. And in the end they figure the
administration will get another conservative on the Court.' "). On each of the two occasions
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tration interest groups, are unlikely to have the energy to gear up for
many concerted oppositions in a row137 -and beyond the occasional
ritual slaughter, the likely political returns diminish. Thus, there has
been little indication (pre- or post-appointment) that Justice Kennedy
is philosophically much different from Bork, 138 and while subsequent
since 1930 when a nominee to the Supreme Court was rejected, the President's second choice
was turned down as well. (Douglas Ginsburg's name was withdrawn before proceeding to the
hearing stage, but that seems for present purposes not very different from a Senate rejection.)
Each second choice had a fatal nonideological flaw, however: Judge Carswell seemed simply
not qualified intellectually, and Judge Ginsburg was identified by informants as having smoked
marijuana on a number of occasions. In addition, Carswell was plainly a "screw you"
nomination in both style and substance, a caricature of the caricature of Haynsworth the
Senate had refused to confirm. Reagan indicated he was going to send that kind of
replacement up for Bork, but didn't. (Ginsburg is conservative, but a good deal less
contentious than Bork.) I suppose it is conceivable, though, that the Senate may fall into a
pattern of "flexing its muscles" by rejecting two candidates every few vacancies. For the
reasons developed in the text that too is not likely to matter greatly, except to the victims.
(Curiously, President Cleveland lost two nominees too, when William B. Hornblower and
Wheeler H. Peckham were both rejected in 1894. Thus on three of the four most recent
occasions when a presidential nominee was rejected, two were. The exception was the rejection
of nominee John J. Parker in 1930, followed by the nomination of Owen J. Roberts, who was
confirmed. Parker and Roberts were not philosophically very different; if anything, Parker,
defeated by conservatives, probably panned out as somewhat more supportive of New Deal
measures than his replacement. Freund, supra note 120, at 1155.)
137 See, e.g., Wash. Post, Nov. 13, 1987, at All, col. 2 (quoting Sen. John McCain:
"Nobody wants to go through that again. There's just too much blood on the floor.").
138 See generally Chemerinsky, supra note 18, at 44-45 (noting that Justice Kennedy, in his
first term, cast the fifth critical vote in a series of conservative decisions); James v. Illinois, 110
S. Ct. 648, 657-61 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (joined by the other Reagan appointees on
the Court, Kennedy argued that the impeachment exception to the exclusionary rule should be
expanded). Despite ex-Judge Bork's criticism of the flag burning decision, it would not have
been out of character for a Justice Bork to have joined the majority (as Kennedy did) in
invalidating the Texas statute. Political expression was one right to which both Professor Bork
and Judge Bork were prepared to give comparatively strenuous protection. See Bork, Neutral
Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L.J. 1, 20-35 (1971); Finzer v. Barry,
798 F.2d 1450 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Lebron v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 749 F.2d
893 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Bork, J.,
concurring) is the only major case in which Bork and Scalia (who joined the Supreme Court
majority in voiding the flag burning statute) voted differently while they were both on the
Court of Appeals (they agreed 98% of the time, R. Bork, supra note 30, at 284), and it was
Bork who came down on the side of the first amendment. (Admittedly the expression
protected in Olman was a newspaper criticism of a Marxist political science professor for
allegedly using his class as a soapbox for revolution.) Even Bork's ability to explain in clear
terms what seemed to elude certain other commentators, that the (since-invalidated) statutory
"fix" for Texas v. Johnson was not distinguishable in terms of the logic of the first amendment
from the law the Court had earlier struck down, N.Y. Times, July 20, 1989, at A14, col. 4,
suggests at least the possibility of some deep sympathy with that logic, as thoroughgoing
opponents of a position rarely are able to characterize it with much sensitivity. Finally, of
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developments have moved Justice Blackmun significantly to the
left, 139 at the time of his appointment he was not regarded as
importantly different in terms of predicted performance from
Haynsworth.14o
course, Bork, as a narrowly confirmed "originalist," would have unusual incentives to enforce
vigorously those rights that unarguably are to be found in the document.
I don't suppose I've lulled you into forgetting the troublesome datum that Bork has been
critical of Johnson since it came down. See R. Bork, supra note 30, at 127-28. He seems to
have chosen, however, to spend the next phase of his career as a sort of all-purpose
conservative critic of the judicial scene, in which role criticism of the flag burning decisions
seems de rigueur. I'm certainly not suggesting insincerity here-this does not appear to be an
issue that Bork had previously addressed-only the understandable pull of the role he has
assumed since his rejection (which choice in itself, by the way, is also quite understandable).
My point is that the pulls on a Justice Bork would have been quite, perhaps dispositively,
different. To the same effect, see Anastaplo, Bork on Bork, 84 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1142, 1165
(1990). (Bork's criticism of Johnson has alluded to a purported distinction, between the
substance of what was being said and the mode of saying it, R. Bork, supra note 30, at 127,
that is so shallow and widely discredited it is at least doubtful that he would have relied on it,
after debate, had he been the deciding vote in an important Supreme Court case. Texas
outlawed desecration of the state or national flag, as opposed to other pieces of cloth, because
of the sentiments such desecration conveyed: that is the relevant first amendment point. See
Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First
Amendment Analysis, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1482, 1497-98 (1975).)
It is entirely possible that I am wrong in this speculation. (Neither I nor even Bork can be
entirely sure about how he would have voted in Johnson had he become a Justice, though I
grant you he is the better witness by a fair margin.) In any event, the flag case, at least thus
far, seems an isolated event: Kennedy does not generally seem to be evolving as significantly
more "liberal" than Bork would have been (though if characterizations like this help
encourage him to do so, that would be all right too). Cf. Minnick v. Mississippi, 111 S. Ct. 486
(1990) (Kennedy writing the opinion for the Court that expanded a criminal defendant's right
to counsel); infra note 139 (possible effect of academic criticism on Blackmun).
139 Subsequent appointments "to his right" have moved him, as they have others before
him, to the left. Moreover, the formative case for Blackmun plainly was Roe v. Wade, where
his longtime association with the Mayo Clinic and consequent deference to the opinions of
doctors seem to have overcome any "legal process" instinct he might have previously harbored
toward distinguishing desirable policy from constitutional law: the opinion is a classic in its
assimilation of the two. It thus was attacked not only from the political right, e.g., Epstein,
Substantive Due Process By Any Other Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 Sup. Ct. Rev. 159,
but also by liberal legal process aficionados, e.g., Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment
on Roe v. Wade, 82 Yale L.J. 920 (1973), apparently leaving the Justice with little use for
either perspective.
140 At the time of his appointment Blackmun was reputed to have been Chief Justice
Burger's recommendation. Whether or not this is true, the rumor was certainly known to the
Senate. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1970, at 34 col. 6 (nominee Blackmun "appears strikingly
like Mr. Burger in judicial philosophy"). In the 1971 Term, Blackmun voted with Justice
Rehnquist 81.0% of the time, with Justice Brennan 48.3% of the time. The Supreme Court,
1971 Term, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 50, 301 (1972). For an enlightening look at the pre-Roe
Blackmun (and in particular his concern for privacy), see Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309
Another Such Victory
It is possible that the Senate could truly toughen up and attempt to
do more than harass, that is, to demonstrate a determination to hold
out until it gets somebody who fits its agenda. Possible, yes, but two
things should be noted. First, no matter how tough it gets, the best
the Senate will be able to hope for is compromise. It can hold out till
hell freezes over, and it still won't acquire the ability to send a nomi-
nation up.141 Second, you shouldn't hold your breath. Habits of def-
erence die hard, especially for a body whose members' principal
priorities seem to be keeping (a) out of the line of fire, and (b) their
jobs.
An obvious objection to the suggestion that presidents will be able
by virtue of their appointment power to exercise relatively effective
control over the Supreme Court is that justices outlast presidents.
Thus, the argument would run, the "other branch" in our recon-
figured separation of powers will comprise people generally appointed
not by the President but by his predecessors. There are two answers
to this. First, one shouldn't be misled by recent conspicuous cases of
justices who vow to die on the bench and then decide not to die at all.
In the 122 years since we finally settled on a nine-person Supreme
Court, presidents have made sixty-seven (confirmed) appointments to
it. That's one appointment every 1.82 years, 142 which means that a
President serving eight years gets to make, on average, 4.39 appoint-
ments-a President serving a four-year term half that many. Conse-
quently, by the end of a President's term, several of the justices are
likely to be his appointees. 143
(1971) (Blackmun, J., for the Court); see also, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403
U.S. 713, 759 (1971) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
141 It is also my impression that the President generally wins games of chicken. Cf. Ely,
The American War in Indochina, Part I: The (Troubled) Constitutionality of the War They
Told Us About, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 877, 915-16 (1990) (describing a failed attempt to coerce the
President to sign an amendment by inserting it in a general appropriations bill). In this
context a stalemate will mean an empty seat on the bench, something there are legitimate
pressures from all sides to avoid.
142 Obviously there are short-run ups and downs, but (somewhat contrary to my intuition)
this number has not increased-and thus the number of appointments per four-year term has
not decreased-over the long term.
143 From Inauguration Day 1869 to Inauguration Day 1989, 22 men served as President,
yielding a precise average of three Supreme Court appointments per President. A President
not serving out a term for which he was elected is almost certain to be replaced by a




Beyond that, so long as we remain in a pattern of Republican presi-
dents, which many pundits are predicting will be quite a while, the
objection becomes even more attenuated: if they were all appointed by
Republicans (and checked for dangerous tendencies to let their
notions of constitutional compulsion stray from their political prefer-
ences) it won't matter greatly to, say, a President Quayle that he
didn't personally put them there. Naturally we won't have Republi-
can presidents forever. Over the course of our history, however, pres-
idents have run in streaks-a run of Democrats, a run of Republicans,
a run of Somebody Elses. If this continues, and I know no reason to
suppose it won't, the general point will remain valid. For every Presi-
dent except the comparatively rare one who has interrupted a long
reign by the other party, most of the sitting justices-given the expul-
sion of the legal process joker (and the consequent reduction of sur-
prise)-are likely to be quite simpatico.
CONCLUDING CONSTRUCTIVE POSTSCRIPT
Our best hope for a viable counterbalance to the President thus
remains with Congress. It would certainly be a good thing, as many
well-meaning commentaries have suggested, if Congress would pull
up its socks and get back into the policy-making business. Some glim-
mers of hope are cited here, among which are the beginnings of a
restrengthening of the political parties 1" and some moves away from
"subcommittee government" 145 toward a more "floor-centered" Con-
gress. 146 But they certainly are no more than glimmers, and even if
Congress were serious it would be years before either showed real
effects. Given the incentive system we have described, it is difficult to
imagine Congress ever enthusiastically reinserting itself into the pol-
icy-making (and heat-taking) arena without significant outside prod-
ding, and equally difficult to imagine the voting public's ever insisting
that it do so.14 7
There are other potential prodders, however: the courts can play a
useful role in forcing Congress to perform its constitutionally-contem-
144 See P. Herrnson, Party Campaigning in the 1980s (1988).
145 See Shepsle, The Changing Textbook Congress, in Can the Government Govern? 238-66
(J. Chubb & P. Peterson eds. 1989).
146 Thus far, however, there is little evidence that floor-generated legislation proves any
more coherent than committee-generated legislation. S. Smith, supra note 59.
147 E.g., M. Fiorina, supra note 59, at 76-77.
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Another Such Victory
plated functions.1 4 Helping devise such judicial Congress-prodding
doctrines thus seems to me the most productive use that can currently
be made of a constitutional scholar's time; at any rate it's how I've
been spending mine lately. 14 9 The attentive reader will discern in
such efforts an attempt to resolve what might have been taken to be
the paradox in my work between the call for deference to the consid-
ered products of legislatures and the observation that legislative prod-
ucts are frequently unconsidered. You also will not have missed the
unsurprising fact that what is suggested is yet another "legal process"
technique. It is, however-as most of my earlier work has been as
well-an "activist" use of legal process, one I am suggesting will ulti-
mately be more useful in reinvigorating our separation of powers than
the more common contemporary impulse toward having the courts do
the legislating themselves.
148 See, e.g., A. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 143-56 (1962); J. Ely, supra note 4, at
131-34.
149 Ely, supra note 89, at 1405-17, 1420; Ely, supra note 141, at 926; Ely, supra note 91, at
1135; Ely, Kuwait, the Constitution, and the Courts: Two Cheers for Judge Greene, 8 Const.
Commentary (forthcoming 1991).
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